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List of Russian philosophers
Russian philosophy includes a variety of philosophical movements. Authors who developed them are listed below sorted by movement.
While most authors listed below are primarily philosophers, also included here are some Russian fiction writers, such as Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, who are also known as philosophers.
Russian philosophy as a separate entity started its development in the 19th century, defined initially by the opposition of Westernizers, advocating Russia's following the Western political and economical models, and Slavophiles, insisting on developing Russia as a unique civilization. The latter group included Nikolai Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontiev, the early founders of eurasianism. The discussion of Russia's place in the world has since become the most characteristic feature of Russian philosophy.
In its further development, Russian philosophy was also marked by deep connection to literature and interest in creativity, society, politics and nationalism cosmos and religion were other notable subjects.
From the early 1920s to late 1980s, Russian philosophy was dominated by Marxism presented as dogma and not grounds for discussion. Stalin's purges, culminating in 1937, delivered a deadly blow to the development of philosophy. [ citation needed ]
A handful of dissident philosophers survived through the Soviet period, among them Aleksei Losev. Stalin's death in 1953 gave way for new schools of thought to spring up, among them Moscow Logic Circle, and Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was a Swiss philosopher and a pivotal figure of the European Enlightenment. The French Revolution was shaped more by Rousseau’s ideas than by the works of any other figure.
Rousseau was born in Geneva, where he was raised and educated by his father, a skilled clockmaker. After a number of different jobs and failed apprenticeships, he moved to Paris at age 30, taking up employment as a government official while studying political philosophy in his spare time.
Rousseau made several contributions to Denis Diderot‘s Encyclopédia and in 1750 won a major essay competition, after which he returned to Geneva and began writing in earnest.
In 1762, Rousseau published two of his best known books: The Social Contract and Emile.
The Social Contract was a philosophical discourse on the relationship between government and individuals. It suggested an unwritten contract between people and the state. It also contained the immortal line “Man is born free yet everywhere he is in chains”. Emile continued on the same theme while considering how individuals should be educated to become better citizens.
These works thrust Rousseau into the public arena – but his strong criticisms of royalty, aristocracy and religion also saw him hounded out of Geneva. He returned to France, where he lived out the remainder of his years.
Rousseau was dead long before the tumultuous events of 1789, however, his writings and ideas about government, society and individual liberties underpinned French revolutionary ideas and inspired some of the revolution’s leading figures, from Jean-Sylvain Bailly to Maximilien Robespierre.
Student Made History
Philosophers And Ideas During The Industrial Revolution
Pictures of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, Two philosophers during The Industrial Revolution who supported opposite ideas about the economy.
A chart showing the different traits of the new idea during The Industrial Revolution called Laissez-faire, meaning let do in french.
This primary source is a pdf of a book that was written by Adam Smith who was a Capitalist philosopher during The Industrial Revolution in 1776. Adam Smith supported Laissez-faire, meaning let do is french, and wrote about how economic freedom would lead to progress. The book talks about the natural thoughts and actions of people and created the three natural laws which were ways that human nature could make a nation wealthier. His three laws were self interest, competition, and supply and demand. His book is filled the productive ideas for the economy that were influenced by The Industrial Revolution.
This primary source is a pdf of a book that was written by Karl Marx who was a Socialist philosopher during the end of The Industrial Revolution in 1848. In this source, Karl Marx describes communism and what the people would get of it. He did not support The Industrial Revolution. He believed that workers were being treated unfairly. All of the power and money was going to the factory owners while the workers were the ones laboring all day. Karl Marx is a good example of philosophers that differently about The Industrial revolution. Since he was alive near the end, he got a good view of everything that happened during that time to create his ideas.
Famous Philosophers / 50 Greatest Philosophers
The History of philosophy is as rich as it is complex. Here is an overview of great philosophers and major schools of thought that have punctuated the long history of philosophy from Ancient Greece to the Modern World.
Below you will find a comprehensive list of great philosophers and links to their philosophy, their quotes, or their major philosophical works. They stand as major philosophers and to this day are still read by philosophy students because of their contributions to the field and history of philosophy.
Some schools of thought are still represented in contemporary philosophical thought while others have been left dormant for over 2000 years. We’ve sorted the philosophical schools of thought by period (Antiquity / Middle Ages / Modernity / Contemporary) for easier visibility on and clearer understanding of the currents in the history of philosophy.
Even when the plurality of manners in which “revolution” is used in the domains of technology and science, culture and art, is left aside and when the term is applied in the domain of politics only, the heterogeneity and contested nature of understandings remains considerable. In spite of the wide range of specific approaches, arguments, and agendas characteristic of the individual theories of political revolution, they can be situated within one multifaceted, yet unified intellectual space: From the theoretical enablers and “inventors” of revolution like Rousseau, Paine, or Kant to contemporary thinkers of revolution like Balibar or Graeber, their theories have been confronted with a number of central problems and questions which open up, shape, and sustain this space. It is primarily in terms of these central questions that they have attempted to conceptually grasp revolution. Six of these questions have been outlined in the above sections: (1) the question of revolutionary novelty which is discussed on a spectrum between the extremes of absolute and relative notions of rupture and beginning (2) the question of revolutionary violence and its legitimacy discussed on the spectrum between unqualified approval and unreserved exclusion as a means of revolution (3) the question of revolutionary freedom discussed on the spectrum between negative (liberation) and positive (foundation) concepts of freedom as the aim of revolution (4) the question of the revolutionary subject discussed on the spectrum between individual doers on the one end and a global “multitude” on the other (5) the question of the revolutionary object or target discussed on the spectrum between political, social institutions and individual, subjective attitudes, convictions, and beliefs and, (6), the question of the temporal and spatial extension of revolution discussed on the spectrum between momentary and local on the one end, permanent and global on the other. Despite their pronounced heterogeneity and their attempts to periodically redefine revolution, it is with respect to these key questions that the theories presented here share family resemblances to one another.
Defining whether political change can be considered revolutionary constitutes the conceptual issue at the core of these theories. In particular, they aim at circumscribing revolution in regard to related, yet distinct concepts such as revolt, rebellion, and reform whereby the questions of the new, of liberty, and of the legitimacy of violence serve as the most relevant criteria for demarcation. The first two criteria play a central role in the distinction between revolution on the one hand, revolt and rebellion on the other. As a consequence of the underlying main goal of casting off an unjust, oppressive regime, both revolt and rebellion are based on limited notions of novelty and liberty. Thus, in comparison to revolutionary change, the specific kind of change they aspire to is more marginal in its scope. However, once revolution is not conceived as momentary but as procedural (as is the case in Kant’s or Marx’s considerations), drawing such a clear conceptual line seems less feasible: If revolution is understood as a temporal sequence that encompasses multiple stages, an initial “revolting” or “rebellious” phase is conceivable, for which the aspect of durable foundation of a new order is secondary. For the differentiation of revolution and reform, the criteria of novelty and violence are central. Whereas the criterion of violence reliably allows for a demarcation, temporalized understandings of revolution entail the blurring of a seemingly obvious difference with respect to the aspect of novelty: Here, a concluding “reformist” phase of revolution is thinkable in which the configuration of an institutional order or the establishment of a common ground with former “enemies of the revolution” takes precedence. Accordingly, when Kropotkin links revolution and revolt or when Kant explicitly associates revolution with reform, the relatedness between these concepts and not to mention the phenomena is reflected. In light of these resemblances, attempts at a precise conceptual critique of revolution, which distinguishes it sharply from revolt, rebellion, or reform remain heuristic in character.
Determining if and under what conditions revolutionary action and, especially, revolutionary violence are morally justified constitutes the normative issue at the core of theories of revolution. Although revolution represents the most radical expression of dissent and protest, the determination of its legitimacy reveals points of contact with debates on less extreme forms of a politics of resistance and transformation such as, for example, civil disobedience (compare Rawls, 1999). Despite the differences as to, inter alia, the scope of the envisaged transformation, their legitimacy essentially depends on the underlying cause and motivation. Revolutionary action and, with it, at least temporary political disorder, can only be considered legitimate if it aims at overcoming continued violations of the basic rights of specific groups or entire nations by the regime in power that are both severe and systematic. While conflict between ruling powers and revolutionary movements typically takes place within the context of a state, broader issues independent of the policies of a specific state can also be invoked as a justified cause to engage in radically transformative politics. The Occupy movement and its appeal to the inequalities brought about by the current global economic system is a case in point. Within and beyond the context of the state, the intention to right the wrongs—that is, the injustices as to dignity, liberty, and equality—committed by a regime and secured by unjust political, legal, social, or economic institutions is the primary precondition for a revolutionary project’s justifiability.
Furthermore, the (il)legitimacy of revolutionary politics is determined by the heavily disputed question of the permissibility of revolutionary violence. In relation to this question, the focus is not on the just cause, the right reason and intention of such a politics, but on the conduct in the course of its realization. The dispute pertains to different dimensions: It concerns the general issue whether violence can be considered a politically and, more importantly, morally justifiable means of revolution, in other words, whether, based on strategic or principled considerations, its use can be justified at all. In addition, it concerns more specific issues such as its justifiable form (for example, violence against property), scope (for example, violence limited to early stages of the revolutionary process), and status (for example, violence as a last resort once all peaceful alternatives have failed). Here, the discussion on revolution resembles theoretical debates on just war (Arendt, 2006  Walzer, 2006 ). For instance, much like in the case of the ius in bello, attempts to formulate essential criteria of acceptable revolutionary conduct aim at ensuring the proportionality of the use of violence, at discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets, and at prohibiting hostile acts which are “vile in themselves” (compare Kant, 2006c [1795/96]). Besides the perspectives of cause (in analogy to the terminology of just war theory: ius ad revolutionem) and conduct (ius in revolutione), there is a third critical perspective, in terms of which the legitimacy of revolutionary action and violence is determined. This perspective focuses on the ius post revolutionem, that is, on the final stage of a revolution, and assesses its capacity to terminate the state of exception in order to transition into a new and stable political order. Thereby, the stability of such a reconstitution is largely predicated on reconciliation with and inclusion of former adversaries. It is mainly thanks to the criteria of cause, conduct, and reconstitution that revolutionary violence becomes distinguishable from the violence used by criminals and, especially, terrorists. However, largely on the basis of formative historical experiences of excessive revolutionary violence—of revolutions not only harming their enemies, but also “devouring their children” —as well as of Gandhi’s or Mandela’s successful transformative projects, non-violent revolutionary action generally has a greater claim to justification.
A further relevant issue with regard to just revolution theory pertains to the self-authorization of revolutionary movements, which raises the questions whom such movements speak for and whose interests they represent. This issue crystallizes in revolutionary declarations that often appeal to “the people” (compare Habermas, 1990 Derrida, 2002). In this case, the legitimacy of a revolutionary project depends, among other things, on whether the revolutionaries’ political power and the sovereignty of the regime they establish is based on force or on discourse, that is, on oppression or persuasion of the majority.
To conclude, this article provides a sample of the rich theoretical discourse surrounding the contested concept of revolution. While the positions developed within the three dominant schools of thought (democratic, communist, and anarchist) are strongly shaped by broader commitments to the underlying political philosophies and often indebted to other debates (for example, on war), this discourse has distinctive features due to the specificity of its object of investigation and the controversial exchange of views between the different traditions. Given both its width and unsettledness, there are significant conceptual and normative issues for philosophers to address. It is not only in light of the often problematic history of revolutions that it is expedient to theoretically “provide yardsticks and measurements” (Hannah Arendt) a thorough analysis and critical assessment of transformative concepts, agendas, and strategies is also required because of the contemporary re-emergence of movements with revolutionary aspirations from the Zapatistas to the Arabellion, Occupy, or the Indignados.
Childhood and early education: 1818–1836
Karl Heinrich Marx was born on 5 May 1818 to Heinrich Marx (1777–1838) and Henriette Pressburg (1788–1863). He was born at Brückengasse 664 in Trier, an ancient city then part of the Kingdom of Prussia's Province of the Lower Rhine.  Marx' family was originally (non-religious) Jewish, but converted formally to Christianity in his early childhood. His maternal grandfather was a Dutch rabbi, while his paternal line had supplied Trier's rabbis since 1723, a role taken by his grandfather Meier Halevi Marx.  His father, as a child known as Herschel, was the first in the line to receive a secular education. He became a lawyer with a comfortably upper middle class income and the family owned a number of Moselle vineyards, in addition to his income as an attorney. Prior to his son's birth and after the abrogation of Jewish emancipation in the Rhineland,  Herschel converted from Judaism to join the state Evangelical Church of Prussia, taking on the German forename Heinrich over the Yiddish Herschel. 
Largely non-religious, Heinrich was a man of the Enlightenment, interested in the ideas of the philosophers Immanuel Kant and Voltaire. A classical liberal, he took part in agitation for a constitution and reforms in Prussia, which was then an absolute monarchy.  In 1815, Heinrich Marx began working as an attorney and in 1819 moved his family to a ten-room property near the Porta Nigra.  His wife, Henriette Pressburg, was a Dutch Jewish woman from a prosperous business family that later founded the company Philips Electronics. Her sister Sophie Pressburg (1797–1854) married Lion Philips (1794–1866) and was the grandmother of both Gerard and Anton Philips and great-grandmother to Frits Philips. Lion Philips was a wealthy Dutch tobacco manufacturer and industrialist, upon whom Karl and Jenny Marx would later often come to rely for loans while they were exiled in London. 
Little is known of Marx's childhood.  The third of nine children, he became the eldest son when his brother Moritz died in 1819.  Marx and his surviving siblings, Sophie, Hermann, Henriette, Louise, Emilie, and Caroline, were baptised into the Lutheran Church in August 1824, and their mother in November 1825.  Marx was privately educated by his father until 1830 when he entered Trier High School (Gymnasium zu Trier [de] ), whose headmaster, Hugo Wyttenbach, was a friend of his father. By employing many liberal humanists as teachers, Wyttenbach incurred the anger of the local conservative government. Subsequently, police raided the school in 1832 and discovered that literature espousing political liberalism was being distributed among the students. Considering the distribution of such material a seditious act, the authorities instituted reforms and replaced several staff during Marx's attendance. 
In October 1835 at the age of 17, Marx travelled to the University of Bonn wishing to study philosophy and literature, but his father insisted on law as a more practical field.  Due to a condition referred to as a "weak chest",  Marx was excused from military duty when he turned 18. While at the University at Bonn, Marx joined the Poets' Club, a group containing political radicals that were monitored by the police.  Marx also joined the Trier Tavern Club drinking society (German: Landsmannschaft der Treveraner) where many ideas were discussed and at one point he served as the club's co-president.   Additionally, Marx was involved in certain disputes, some of which became serious: in August 1836 he took part in a duel with a member of the university's Borussian Korps.  Although his grades in the first term were good, they soon deteriorated, leading his father to force a transfer to the more serious and academic University of Berlin. 
Hegelianism and early journalism: 1836–1843
Spending summer and autumn 1836 in Trier, Marx became more serious about his studies and his life. He became engaged to Jenny von Westphalen, an educated member of the petty nobility who had known Marx since childhood. As she had broken off her engagement with a young aristocrat to be with Marx, their relationship was socially controversial owing to the differences between their religious and class origins, but Marx befriended her father Ludwig von Westphalen (a liberal aristocrat) and later dedicated his doctoral thesis to him.  Seven years after their engagement, on 19 June 1843, they married in a Protestant church in Kreuznach. 
In October 1836, Marx arrived in Berlin, matriculating in the university's faculty of law and renting a room in the Mittelstrasse.  During the first term, Marx attended lectures of Eduard Gans (who represented the progressive Hegelian standpoint, elaborated on rational development in history by emphasising particularly its libertarian aspects, and the importance of social question) and of Karl von Savigny (who represented the Historical School of Law).  Although studying law, he was fascinated by philosophy and looked for a way to combine the two, believing that "without philosophy nothing could be accomplished".  Marx became interested in the recently deceased German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, whose ideas were then widely debated among European philosophical circles.  During a convalescence in Stralau, he joined the Doctor's Club (Doktorklub), a student group which discussed Hegelian ideas, and through them became involved with a group of radical thinkers known as the Young Hegelians in 1837. They gathered around Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer, with Marx developing a particularly close friendship with Adolf Rutenberg. Like Marx, the Young Hegelians were critical of Hegel's metaphysical assumptions, but adopted his dialectical method to criticise established society, politics and religion from a leftist perspective.  Marx's father died in May 1838, resulting in a diminished income for the family.  Marx had been emotionally close to his father and treasured his memory after his death. 
By 1837, Marx was writing both fiction and non-fiction, having completed a short novel, Scorpion and Felix a drama, Oulanem as well as a number of love poems dedicated to Jenny von Westphalen. None of this early work was published during his lifetime.  The love poems were published posthumously in the Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Volume 1.  Marx soon abandoned fiction for other pursuits, including the study of both English and Italian, art history and the translation of Latin classics.  He began co-operating with Bruno Bauer on editing Hegel's Philosophy of Religion in 1840. Marx was also engaged in writing his doctoral thesis, The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature,  which he completed in 1841. It was described as "a daring and original piece of work in which Marx set out to show that theology must yield to the superior wisdom of philosophy".  The essay was controversial, particularly among the conservative professors at the University of Berlin. Marx decided instead to submit his thesis to the more liberal University of Jena, whose faculty awarded him his Ph.D. in April 1841.   As Marx and Bauer were both atheists, in March 1841 they began plans for a journal entitled Archiv des Atheismus (Atheistic Archives), but it never came to fruition. In July, Marx and Bauer took a trip to Bonn from Berlin. There they scandalised their class by getting drunk, laughing in church and galloping through the streets on donkeys. 
Marx was considering an academic career, but this path was barred by the government's growing opposition to classical liberalism and the Young Hegelians.  Marx moved to Cologne in 1842, where he became a journalist, writing for the radical newspaper Rheinische Zeitung (Rhineland News), expressing his early views on socialism and his developing interest in economics. Marx criticised right-wing European governments as well as figures in the liberal and socialist movements, whom he thought ineffective or counter-productive.  The newspaper attracted the attention of the Prussian government censors, who checked every issue for seditious material before printing, as Marx lamented: "Our newspaper has to be presented to the police to be sniffed at, and if the police nose smells anything un-Christian or un-Prussian, the newspaper is not allowed to appear".  After the Rheinische Zeitung published an article strongly criticising the Russian monarchy, Tsar Nicholas I requested it be banned and Prussia's government complied in 1843. 
In 1843, Marx became co-editor of a new, radical leftist Parisian newspaper, the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (German-French Annals), then being set up by the German activist Arnold Ruge to bring together German and French radicals.  Therefore Marx and his wife moved to Paris in October 1843. Initially living with Ruge and his wife communally at 23 Rue Vaneau, they found the living conditions difficult, so moved out following the birth of their daughter Jenny in 1844.  Although intended to attract writers from both France and the German states, the Jahrbücher was dominated by the latter and the only non-German writer was the exiled Russian anarchist collectivist Mikhail Bakunin.  Marx contributed two essays to the paper, "Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right"  and "On the Jewish Question",  the latter introducing his belief that the proletariat were a revolutionary force and marking his embrace of communism.  Only one issue was published, but it was relatively successful, largely owing to the inclusion of Heinrich Heine's satirical odes on King Ludwig of Bavaria, leading the German states to ban it and seize imported copies (Ruge nevertheless refused to fund the publication of further issues and his friendship with Marx broke down).  After the paper's collapse, Marx began writing for the only uncensored German-language radical newspaper left, Vorwärts! (Forward!). Based in Paris, the paper was connected to the League of the Just, a utopian socialist secret society of workers and artisans. Marx attended some of their meetings but did not join.  In Vorwärts!, Marx refined his views on socialism based upon Hegelian and Feuerbachian ideas of dialectical materialism, at the same time criticising liberals and other socialists operating in Europe. 
On 28 August 1844, Marx met the German socialist Friedrich Engels at the Café de la Régence, beginning a lifelong friendship.  Engels showed Marx his recently published The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844,   convincing Marx that the working class would be the agent and instrument of the final revolution in history.   Soon, Marx and Engels were collaborating on a criticism of the philosophical ideas of Marx's former friend, Bruno Bauer. This work was published in 1845 as The Holy Family.   Although critical of Bauer, Marx was increasingly influenced by the ideas of the Young Hegelians Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach, but eventually Marx and Engels abandoned Feuerbachian materialism as well. 
During the time that he lived at 38 Rue Vaneau in Paris (from October 1843 until January 1845),  Marx engaged in an intensive study of political economy (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, James Mill, etc.),  the French socialists (especially Claude Henri St. Simon and Charles Fourier)  and the history of France.  The study of political economy is a study that Marx would pursue for the rest of his life  and would result in his major economic work—the three-volume series called Das Kapital.  Marxism is based in large part on three influences: Hegel's dialectics, French utopian socialism and English economics. Together with his earlier study of Hegel's dialectics, the studying that Marx did during this time in Paris meant that all major components of "Marxism" were in place by the autumn of 1844.  Marx was constantly being pulled away from his study of political economy—not only by the usual daily demands of the time, but additionally by editing a radical newspaper and later by organising and directing the efforts of a political party during years of potentially revolutionary popular uprisings of the citizenry. Still Marx was always drawn back to his economic studies: he sought "to understand the inner workings of capitalism". 
An outline of "Marxism" had definitely formed in the mind of Karl Marx by late 1844. Indeed, many features of the Marxist view of the world's political economy had been worked out in great detail, but Marx needed to write down all of the details of his economic world view to further clarify the new economic theory in his own mind.  Accordingly, Marx wrote The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.  These manuscripts covered numerous topics, detailing Marx's concept of alienated labour.  However, by the spring of 1845 his continued study of political economy, capital and capitalism had led Marx to the belief that the new political economic theory that he was espousing – scientific socialism – needed to be built on the base of a thoroughly developed materialistic view of the world. 
The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 had been written between April and August 1844, but soon Marx recognised that the Manuscripts had been influenced by some inconsistent ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach. Accordingly, Marx recognised the need to break with Feuerbach's philosophy in favour of historical materialism, thus a year later (in April 1845) after moving from Paris to Brussels, Marx wrote his eleven "Theses on Feuerbach".  The "Theses on Feuerbach" are best known for Thesis 11, which states that "philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it".   This work contains Marx's criticism of materialism (for being contemplative), idealism (for reducing practice to theory), and, overall, philosophy (for putting abstract reality above the physical world).  It thus introduced the first glimpse at Marx's historical materialism, an argument that the world is changed not by ideas but by actual, physical, material activity and practice.   In 1845, after receiving a request from the Prussian king, the French government shut down Vorwärts!, with the interior minister, François Guizot, expelling Marx from France.  At this point, Marx moved from Paris to Brussels, where Marx hoped to once again continue his study of capitalism and political economy.
Unable either to stay in France or to move to Germany, Marx decided to emigrate to Brussels in Belgium in February 1845. However, to stay in Belgium he had to pledge not to publish anything on the subject of contemporary politics.  In Brussels, Marx associated with other exiled socialists from across Europe, including Moses Hess, Karl Heinzen and Joseph Weydemeyer. In April 1845, Engels moved from Barmen in Germany to Brussels to join Marx and the growing cadre of members of the League of the Just now seeking home in Brussels.   Later, Mary Burns, Engels' long-time companion, left Manchester, England to join Engels in Brussels. 
In mid-July 1845, Marx and Engels left Brussels for England to visit the leaders of the Chartists, a working-class movement in Britain. This was Marx's first trip to England and Engels was an ideal guide for the trip. Engels had already spent two years living in Manchester from November 1842  to August 1844.  Not only did Engels already know the English language,  he had also developed a close relationship with many Chartist leaders.  Indeed, Engels was serving as a reporter for many Chartist and socialist English newspapers.  Marx used the trip as an opportunity to examine the economic resources available for study in various libraries in London and Manchester. 
In collaboration with Engels, Marx also set about writing a book which is often seen as his best treatment of the concept of historical materialism, The German Ideology.  In this work, Marx broke with Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner and the rest of the Young Hegelians, while he also broke with Karl Grün and other "true socialists" whose philosophies were still based in part on "idealism". In German Ideology, Marx and Engels finally completed their philosophy, which was based solely on materialism as the sole motor force in history.  German Ideology is written in a humorously satirical form, but even this satirical form did not save the work from censorship. Like so many other early writings of his, German Ideology would not be published in Marx's lifetime and would be published only in 1932.   
After completing German Ideology, Marx turned to a work that was intended to clarify his own position regarding "the theory and tactics" of a truly "revolutionary proletarian movement" operating from the standpoint of a truly "scientific materialist" philosophy.  This work was intended to draw a distinction between the utopian socialists and Marx's own scientific socialist philosophy. Whereas the utopians believed that people must be persuaded one person at a time to join the socialist movement, the way a person must be persuaded to adopt any different belief, Marx knew that people would tend, on most occasions, to act in accordance with their own economic interests, thus appealing to an entire class (the working class in this case) with a broad appeal to the class's best material interest would be the best way to mobilise the broad mass of that class to make a revolution and change society. This was the intent of the new book that Marx was planning, but to get the manuscript past the government censors he called the book The Poverty of Philosophy (1847)  and offered it as a response to the "petty-bourgeois philosophy" of the French anarchist socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as expressed in his book The Philosophy of Poverty (1840). 
These books laid the foundation for Marx and Engels's most famous work, a political pamphlet that has since come to be commonly known as The Communist Manifesto. While residing in Brussels in 1846, Marx continued his association with the secret radical organisation League of the Just.  As noted above, Marx thought the League to be just the sort of radical organisation that was needed to spur the working class of Europe toward the mass movement that would bring about a working-class revolution.  However, to organise the working class into a mass movement the League had to cease its "secret" or "underground" orientation and operate in the open as a political party.  Members of the League eventually became persuaded in this regard. Accordingly, in June 1847 the League was reorganised by its membership into a new open "above ground" political society that appealed directly to the working classes.  This new open political society was called the Communist League.  Both Marx and Engels participated in drawing up the programme and organisational principles of the new Communist League. 
In late 1847, Marx and Engels began writing what was to become their most famous work – a programme of action for the Communist League. Written jointly by Marx and Engels from December 1847 to January 1848, The Communist Manifesto was first published on 21 February 1848.  The Communist Manifesto laid out the beliefs of the new Communist League. No longer a secret society, the Communist League wanted to make aims and intentions clear to the general public rather than hiding its beliefs as the League of the Just had been doing.  The opening lines of the pamphlet set forth the principal basis of Marxism: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles".  It goes on to examine the antagonisms that Marx claimed were arising in the clashes of interest between the bourgeoisie (the wealthy capitalist class) and the proletariat (the industrial working class). Proceeding on from this, the Manifesto presents the argument for why the Communist League, as opposed to other socialist and liberal political parties and groups at the time, was truly acting in the interests of the proletariat to overthrow capitalist society and to replace it with socialism. 
Later that year, Europe experienced a series of protests, rebellions, and often violent upheavals that became known as the Revolutions of 1848.  In France, a revolution led to the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the French Second Republic.  Marx was supportive of such activity and having recently received a substantial inheritance from his father (withheld by his uncle Lionel Philips since his father's death in 1838) of either 6,000  or 5,000 francs   he allegedly used a third of it to arm Belgian workers who were planning revolutionary action.  Although the veracity of these allegations is disputed,   the Belgian Ministry of Justice accused Marx of it, subsequently arresting him and he was forced to flee back to France, where with a new republican government in power he believed that he would be safe.  
Temporarily settling down in Paris, Marx transferred the Communist League executive headquarters to the city and also set up a German Workers' Club with various German socialists living there.  Hoping to see the revolution spread to Germany, in 1848 Marx moved back to Cologne where he began issuing a handbill entitled the Demands of the Communist Party in Germany,  in which he argued for only four of the ten points of the Communist Manifesto, believing that in Germany at that time the bourgeoisie must overthrow the feudal monarchy and aristocracy before the proletariat could overthrow the bourgeoisie.  On 1 June, Marx started the publication of a daily newspaper, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, which he helped to finance through his recent inheritance from his father. Designed to put forward news from across Europe with his own Marxist interpretation of events, the newspaper featured Marx as a primary writer and the dominant editorial influence. Despite contributions by fellow members of the Communist League, according to Friedrich Engels it remained "a simple dictatorship by Marx".   
Whilst editor of the paper, Marx and the other revolutionary socialists were regularly harassed by the police and Marx was brought to trial on several occasions, facing various allegations including insulting the Chief Public Prosecutor, committing a press misdemeanor and inciting armed rebellion through tax boycotting,     although each time he was acquitted.    Meanwhile, the democratic parliament in Prussia collapsed and the king, Frederick William IV, introduced a new cabinet of his reactionary supporters, who implemented counter-revolutionary measures to expunge leftist and other revolutionary elements from the country.  Consequently, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung was soon suppressed and Marx was ordered to leave the country on 16 May.   Marx returned to Paris, which was then under the grip of both a reactionary counter-revolution and a cholera epidemic, and was soon expelled by the city authorities, who considered him a political threat. With his wife Jenny expecting their fourth child and not able to move back to Germany or Belgium, in August 1849 he sought refuge in London.  
Move to London and further writing: 1850–1860
Marx moved to London in early June 1849 and would remain based in the city for the rest of his life. The headquarters of the Communist League also moved to London. However, in the winter of 1849–1850, a split within the ranks of the Communist League occurred when a faction within it led by August Willich and Karl Schapper began agitating for an immediate uprising. Willich and Schapper believed that once the Communist League had initiated the uprising, the entire working class from across Europe would rise "spontaneously" to join it, thus creating revolution across Europe. Marx and Engels protested that such an unplanned uprising on the part of the Communist League was "adventuristic" and would be suicide for the Communist League.  Such an uprising as that recommended by the Schapper/Willich group would easily be crushed by the police and the armed forces of the reactionary governments of Europe. Marx maintained that this would spell doom for the Communist League itself, arguing that changes in society are not achieved overnight through the efforts and will power of a handful of men.  They are instead brought about through a scientific analysis of economic conditions of society and by moving toward revolution through different stages of social development. In the present stage of development (circa 1850), following the defeat of the uprisings across Europe in 1848 he felt that the Communist League should encourage the working class to unite with progressive elements of the rising bourgeoisie to defeat the feudal aristocracy on issues involving demands for governmental reforms, such as a constitutional republic with freely elected assemblies and universal (male) suffrage. In other words, the working class must join with bourgeois and democratic forces to bring about the successful conclusion of the bourgeois revolution before stressing the working class agenda and a working-class revolution.
After a long struggle that threatened to ruin the Communist League, Marx's opinion prevailed and eventually, the Willich/Schapper group left the Communist League. Meanwhile, Marx also became heavily involved with the socialist German Workers' Educational Society.  The Society held their meetings in Great Windmill Street, Soho, central London's entertainment district.   This organisation was also racked by an internal struggle between its members, some of whom followed Marx while others followed the Schapper/Willich faction. The issues in this internal split were the same issues raised in the internal split within the Communist League, but Marx lost the fight with the Schapper/Willich faction within the German Workers' Educational Society and on 17 September 1850 resigned from the Society. 
New-York Daily Tribune and journalism
In the early period in London, Marx committed himself almost exclusively to his studies, such that his family endured extreme poverty.   His main source of income was Engels, whose own source was his wealthy industrialist father.  In Prussia as editor of his own newspaper, and contributor to others ideologically aligned, Marx could reach his audience, the working classes. In London, without finances to run a newspaper themselves, he and Engels turned to international journalism. At one stage they were being published by six newspapers from England, the United States, Prussia, Austria, and South Africa.  Marx's principal earnings came from his work as European correspondent, from 1852 to 1862, for the New-York Daily Tribune,  : 17 and from also producing articles for more "bourgeois" newspapers. Marx had his articles translated from German by Wilhelm Pieper [de] , until his proficiency in English had become adequate. 
The New-York Daily Tribune had been founded in April 1841 by Horace Greeley.  Its editorial board contained progressive bourgeois journalists and publishers, among them George Ripley and the journalist Charles Dana, who was editor-in-chief. Dana, a fourierist and an abolitionist, was Marx's contact. The Tribune was a vehicle for Marx to reach a transatlantic public, such as for his "hidden warfare" against Henry Charles Carey.  The journal had wide working-class appeal from its foundation at two cents, it was inexpensive  and, with about 50,000 copies per issue, its circulation was the widest in the United States.  : 14 Its editorial ethos was progressive and its anti-slavery stance reflected Greeley's.  : 82 Marx's first article for the paper, on the British parliamentary elections, was published on 21 August 1852. 
On 21 March 1857, Dana informed Marx that due to the economic recession only one article a week would be paid for, published or not the others would be paid for only if published. Marx had sent his articles on Tuesdays and Fridays, but, that October, the Tribune discharged all its correspondents in Europe except Marx and B. Taylor, and reduced Marx to a weekly article. Between September and November 1860, only five were published. After a six-month interval, Marx resumed contributions from September 1861 until March 1862, when Dana wrote to inform him that there was no longer space in the Tribune for reports from London, due to American domestic affairs.  In 1868, Dana set up a rival newspaper, the New York Sun, at which he was editor-in-chief.  In April 1857, Dana invited Marx to contribute articles, mainly on military history, to the New American Cyclopedia, an idea of George Ripley, Dana's friend and literary editor of the Tribune. In all, 67 Marx-Engels articles were published, of which 51 were written by Engels, although Marx did some research for them in the British Museum.  By the late 1850s, American popular interest in European affairs waned and Marx's articles turned to topics such as the "slavery crisis" and the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861 in the "War Between the States".  Between December 1851 and March 1852, Marx worked on his theoretical work about the French Revolution of 1848, titled The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.  In this he explored concepts in historical materialism, class struggle, dictatorship of the proletariat, and victory of the proletariat over the bourgeois state. 
The 1850s and 1860s may be said to mark a philosophical boundary distinguishing the young Marx's Hegelian idealism and the more mature Marx's     scientific ideology associated with structural Marxism.  However, not all scholars accept this distinction.   For Marx and Engels, their experience of the Revolutions of 1848 to 1849 were formative in the development of their theory of economics and historical progression. After the "failures" of 1848, the revolutionary impetus appeared spent and not to be renewed without an economic recession. Contention arose between Marx and his fellow communists, whom he denounced as "adventurists". Marx deemed it fanciful to propose that "will power" could be sufficient to create the revolutionary conditions when in reality the economic component was the necessary requisite. The recession in the United States' economy in 1852 gave Marx and Engels grounds for optimism for revolutionary activity, yet this economy was seen as too immature for a capitalist revolution. Open territories on America's western frontier dissipated the forces of social unrest. Moreover, any economic crisis arising in the United States would not lead to revolutionary contagion of the older economies of individual European nations, which were closed systems bounded by their national borders. When the so-called Panic of 1857 in the United States spread globally, it broke all economic theory models, and was the first truly global economic crisis. 
Financial necessity had forced Marx to abandon economic studies in 1844 and give thirteen years to working on other projects. He had always sought to return to economics. [ citation needed ]
First International and Das Kapital
Marx continued to write articles for the New York Daily Tribune as long as he was sure that the Tribune ' s editorial policy was still progressive. However, the departure of Charles Dana from the paper in late 1861 and the resultant change in the editorial board brought about a new editorial policy.  No longer was the Tribune to be a strong abolitionist paper dedicated to a complete Union victory. The new editorial board supported an immediate peace between the Union and the Confederacy in the Civil War in the United States with slavery left intact in the Confederacy. Marx strongly disagreed with this new political position and in 1863 was forced to withdraw as a writer for the Tribune. 
In 1864, Marx became involved in the International Workingmen's Association (also known as the First International),  to whose General Council he was elected at its inception in 1864.  In that organisation, Marx was involved in the struggle against the anarchist wing centred on Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876).  Although Marx won this contest, the transfer of the seat of the General Council from London to New York in 1872, which Marx supported, led to the decline of the International.  The most important political event during the existence of the International was the Paris Commune of 1871 when the citizens of Paris rebelled against their government and held the city for two months. In response to the bloody suppression of this rebellion, Marx wrote one of his most famous pamphlets, "The Civil War in France", a defence of the Commune.  
Given the repeated failures and frustrations of workers' revolutions and movements, Marx also sought to understand capitalism and spent a great deal of time in the reading room of the British Museum studying and reflecting on the works of political economists and on economic data.  By 1857, Marx had accumulated over 800 pages of notes and short essays on capital, landed property, wage labour, the state, and foreign trade, and the world market, though this work did not appear in print until 1939 under the title Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy.   
In 1859, Marx published A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,  his first serious economic work. This work was intended merely as a preview of his three-volume Das Kapital (English title: Capital: Critique of Political Economy), which he intended to publish at a later date. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx expands on the labour theory of value advocated by David Ricardo. The work was enthusiastically received, and the edition sold out quickly. 
The successful sales of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy stimulated Marx in the early 1860s to finish work on the three large volumes that would compose his major life's work – Das Kapital and the Theories of Surplus Value, which discussed the theoreticians of political economy, particularly Adam Smith and David Ricardo.  Theories of Surplus Value is often referred to as the fourth volume of Das Kapital and constitutes one of the first comprehensive treatises on the history of economic thought.  In 1867, the first volume of Das Kapital was published, a work which analysed the capitalist process of production.  Here Marx elaborated his labour theory of value, which had been influenced by Thomas Hodgskin. Marx acknowledged Hodgskin's "admirable work" Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital at more than one point in Das Kapital.  Indeed, Marx quoted Hodgskin as recognising the alienation of labour that occurred under modern capitalist production. No longer was there any "natural reward of individual labour. Each labourer produces only some part of a whole, and each part having no value or utility of itself, there is nothing on which the labourer can seize, and say: 'This is my product, this will I keep to myself'".  In this first volume of Das Kapital, Marx outlined his conception of surplus value and exploitation, which he argued would ultimately lead to a falling rate of profit and the collapse of industrial capitalism.  Demand for a Russian language edition of Das Kapital soon led to the printing of 3,000 copies of the book in the Russian language, which was published on 27 March 1872. By the autumn of 1871, the entire first edition of the German-language edition of Das Kapital had been sold out and a second edition was published.
Volumes II and III of Das Kapital remained mere manuscripts upon which Marx continued to work for the rest of his life. Both volumes were published by Engels after Marx's death.  Volume II of Das Kapital was prepared and published by Engels in July 1893 under the name Capital II: The Process of Circulation of Capital.  Volume III of Das Kapital was published a year later in October 1894 under the name Capital III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole.  Theories of Surplus Value derived from the sprawling Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863, a second draft for Das Kapital, the latter spanning volumes 30–34 of the Collected Works of Marx and Engels. Specifically, Theories of Surplus Value runs from the latter part of the Collected Works' thirtieth volume through the end of their thirty-second volume    meanwhile, the larger Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 run from the start of the Collected Works' thirtieth volume through the first half of their thirty-fourth volume. The latter half of the Collected Works' thirty-fourth volume consists of the surviving fragments of the Economic Manuscripts of 1863–1864, which represented a third draft for Das Kapital, and a large portion of which is included as an appendix to the Penguin edition of Das Kapital, volume I.  A German-language abridged edition of Theories of Surplus Value was published in 1905 and in 1910. This abridged edition was translated into English and published in 1951 in London, but the complete unabridged edition of Theories of Surplus Value was published as the "fourth volume" of Das Kapital in 1963 and 1971 in Moscow. 
During the last decade of his life, Marx's health declined and he became incapable of the sustained effort that had characterised his previous work.  He did manage to comment substantially on contemporary politics, particularly in Germany and Russia. His Critique of the Gotha Programme opposed the tendency of his followers Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel to compromise with the state socialism of Ferdinand Lassalle in the interests of a united socialist party.  This work is also notable for another famous Marx quote: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need". 
In a letter to Vera Zasulich dated 8 March 1881, Marx contemplated the possibility of Russia's bypassing the capitalist stage of development and building communism on the basis of the common ownership of land characteristic of the village mir.   While admitting that Russia's rural "commune is the fulcrum of social regeneration in Russia", Marx also warned that in order for the mir to operate as a means for moving straight to the socialist stage without a preceding capitalist stage it "would first be necessary to eliminate the deleterious influences which are assailing it (the rural commune) from all sides".  Given the elimination of these pernicious influences, Marx allowed that "normal conditions of spontaneous development" of the rural commune could exist.  However, in the same letter to Vera Zasulich he points out that "at the core of the capitalist system . lies the complete separation of the producer from the means of production".  In one of the drafts of this letter, Marx reveals his growing passion for anthropology, motivated by his belief that future communism would be a return on a higher level to the communism of our prehistoric past. He wrote that "the historical trend of our age is the fatal crisis which capitalist production has undergone in the European and American countries where it has reached its highest peak, a crisis that will end in its destruction, in the return of modern society to a higher form of the most archaic type – collective production and appropriation". He added that "the vitality of primitive communities was incomparably greater than that of Semitic, Greek, Roman, etc. societies, and, a fortiori, that of modern capitalist societies".  Before he died, Marx asked Engels to write up these ideas, which were published in 1884 under the title The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.
Marx and von Westphalen had seven children together, but partly owing to the poor conditions in which they lived whilst in London, only three survived to adulthood.  The children were: Jenny Caroline (m. Longuet 1844–1883) Jenny Laura (m. Lafargue 1845–1911) Edgar (1847–1855) Henry Edward Guy ("Guido" 1849–1850) Jenny Eveline Frances ("Franziska" 1851–1852) Jenny Julia Eleanor (1855–1898) and one more who died before being named (July 1857). According to his son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, Marx was a loving father.  In 1962, there were allegations that Marx fathered a son, Freddy,  out of wedlock by his housekeeper, Helene Demuth,  but the claim is disputed for lack of documented evidence. 
Marx frequently used pseudonyms, often when renting a house or flat, apparently to make it harder for the authorities to track him down. While in Paris, he used that of "Monsieur Ramboz", whilst in London, he signed off his letters as "A. Williams". His friends referred to him as "Moor", owing to his dark complexion and black curly hair, while he encouraged his children to call him "Old Nick" and "Charley".  He also bestowed nicknames and pseudonyms on his friends and family as well, referring to Friedrich Engels as "General", his housekeeper Helene as "Lenchen" or "Nym", while one of his daughters, Jennychen, was referred to as "Qui Qui, Emperor of China" and another, Laura, was known as "Kakadou" or "the Hottentot". 
Although Marx had drunk alcohol before he joined the Trier Tavern Club drinking society in the 1830s [ when? ] , after he had joined the club he began to drink more heavily and continued to do so throughout his whole life. 
Marx was afflicted by poor health (what he himself described as "the wretchedness of existence")  and various authors have sought to describe and explain it. His biographer Werner Blumenberg attributed it to liver and gall problems which Marx had in 1849 and from which he was never afterward free, exacerbated by an unsuitable lifestyle. The attacks often came with headaches, eye inflammation, neuralgia in the head, and rheumatic pains. A serious nervous disorder appeared in 1877 and protracted insomnia was a consequence, which Marx fought with narcotics. The illness was aggravated by excessive nocturnal work and faulty diet. Marx was fond of highly seasoned dishes, smoked fish, caviare, pickled cucumbers, "none of which are good for liver patients", but he also liked wine and liqueurs and smoked an enormous amount "and since he had no money, it was usually bad-quality cigars". From 1863, Marx complained a lot about boils: "These are very frequent with liver patients and may be due to the same causes".  The abscesses were so bad that Marx could neither sit nor work upright. According to Blumenberg, Marx's irritability is often found in liver patients:
The illness emphasised certain traits in his character. He argued cuttingly, his biting satire did not shrink at insults, and his expressions could be rude and cruel. Though in general Marx had blind faith in his closest friends, nevertheless he himself complained that he was sometimes too mistrustful and unjust even to them. His verdicts, not only about enemies but even about friends, were sometimes so harsh that even less sensitive people would take offence . There must have been few whom he did not criticize like this . not even Engels was an exception. 
According to Princeton historian J.E. Seigel, in his late teens, Marx may have had pneumonia or pleurisy, the effects of which led to his being exempted from Prussian military service. In later life whilst working on Das Kapital (which he never completed),  Marx suffered from a trio of afflictions. A liver ailment, probably hereditary, was aggravated by overwork, a bad diet, and lack of sleep. Inflammation of the eyes was induced by too much work at night. A third affliction, eruption of carbuncles or boils, "was probably brought on by general physical debility to which the various features of Marx's style of life – alcohol, tobacco, poor diet, and failure to sleep – all contributed. Engels often exhorted Marx to alter this dangerous regime". In Professor Siegel's thesis, what lay behind this punishing sacrifice of his health may have been guilt about self-involvement and egoism, originally induced in Karl Marx by his father. 
In 2007, a retrodiagnosis of Marx's skin disease was made by dermatologist Sam Shuster of Newcastle University and for Shuster, the most probable explanation was that Marx suffered not from liver problems, but from hidradenitis suppurativa, a recurring infective condition arising from blockage of apocrine ducts opening into hair follicles. This condition, which was not described in the English medical literature until 1933 (hence would not have been known to Marx's physicians), can produce joint pain (which could be misdiagnosed as rheumatic disorder) and painful eye conditions. To arrive at his retrodiagnosis, Shuster considered the primary material: the Marx correspondence published in the 50 volumes of the Marx/Engels Collected Works. There, "although the skin lesions were called 'furuncles', 'boils' and 'carbuncles' by Marx, his wife, and his physicians, they were too persistent, recurrent, destructive and site-specific for that diagnosis". The sites of the persistent 'carbuncles' were noted repeatedly in the armpits, groins, perianal, genital (penis and scrotum) and suprapubic regions and inner thighs, "favoured sites of hidradenitis suppurativa". Professor Shuster claimed the diagnosis "can now be made definitively". 
Shuster went on to consider the potential psychosocial effects of the disease, noting that the skin is an organ of communication and that hidradenitis suppurativa produces much psychological distress, including loathing and disgust and depression of self-image, mood, and well-being, feelings for which Shuster found "much evidence" in the Marx correspondence. Professor Shuster went on to ask himself whether the mental effects of the disease affected Marx's work and even helped him to develop his theory of alienation. 
Following the death of his wife Jenny in December 1881, Marx developed a catarrh that kept him in ill health for the last 15 months of his life. It eventually brought on the bronchitis and pleurisy that killed him in London on 14 March 1883, when he died a stateless person at age 64.  Family and friends in London buried his body in Highgate Cemetery (East), London, on 17 March 1883 in an area reserved for agnostics and atheists (George Eliot's grave is nearby). According to Francis Wheen there were between nine and eleven mourners at his funeral,   however research from contemporary sources identifies thirteen named individuals attending the funeral. They were, Friedrich Engels, Eleanor Marx, Edward Aveling, Paul Lafargue, Charles Longuet, Helene Demuth, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Gottlieb Lemke, Frederick Lessner, G Lochner, Sir Ray Lankester, Carl Schorlemmer and Ernest Radford.  A contemporary newspaper account claims that 25 to 30 relatives and friends attended the funeral.  A writer in The Graphic noted that 'By a strange blunder . his death was not announced for two days, and then as having taken place at Paris. The next day the correction came from Paris and when his friends and followers hastened to his house in Haverstock Hill, to learn the time and place of burial, they learned that he was already in the cold ground. But for this secresy [sic] and haste, a great popular demonstration would undoubtedly have been held over his grave'. 
Several of his closest friends spoke at his funeral, including Wilhelm Liebknecht and Friedrich Engels. Engels' speech included the passage:
On the 14th of March, at a quarter to three in the afternoon, the greatest living thinker ceased to think. He had been left alone for scarcely two minutes, and when we came back we found him in his armchair, peacefully gone to sleep – but forever. 
Marx's surviving daughters Eleanor and Laura, as well as Charles Longuet and Paul Lafargue, Marx's two French socialist sons-in-law, were also in attendance.  He had been predeceased by his wife and his eldest daughter, the latter dying a few months earlier in January 1883. Liebknecht, a founder and leader of the German Social Democratic Party, gave a speech in German and Longuet, a prominent figure in the French working-class movement, made a short statement in French.  Two telegrams from workers' parties in France and Spain [ which? ] were also read out.  Together with Engels's speech, this constituted the entire programme of the funeral.  Non-relatives attending the funeral included three communist associates of Marx: Friedrich Lessner, imprisoned for three years after the Cologne Communist Trial of 1852 G. Lochner, whom Engels described as "an old member of the Communist League" and Carl Schorlemmer, a professor of chemistry in Manchester, a member of the Royal Society and a communist activist involved in the 1848 Baden revolution.  Another attendee of the funeral was Ray Lankester, a British zoologist who would later become a prominent academic. 
Marx left a personal estate valued for probate at £250 (equivalent to £25,365 in 2019  ).  Upon his own death in 1895, Engels left Marx's two surviving daughters a "significant portion" of his considerable estate (valued in 2011 at US$4.8 million). 
Marx and his family were reburied on a new site nearby in November 1954. The tomb at the new site, unveiled on 14 March 1956,  bears the carved message: "Workers of All Lands Unite", the final line of The Communist Manifesto and, from the 11th "Thesis on Feuerbach" (as edited by Engels), "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways—the point however is to change it".  The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) had the monument with a portrait bust by Laurence Bradshaw erected and Marx's original tomb had only humble adornment.  Black civil rights leader and CPGB activist Claudia Jones was later buried beside Karl Marx's tomb.
The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm remarked: "One cannot say Marx died a failure" because although he had not achieved a large following of disciples in Britain, his writings had already begun to make an impact on the leftist movements in Germany and Russia. Within 25 years of his death, the continental European socialist parties that acknowledged Marx's influence on their politics were each gaining between 15 and 47 percent in those countries with representative democratic elections. 
Marx's thought demonstrates influences from many thinkers including, but not limited to:
- 's philosophy 
- The classical political economy (economics) of Adam Smith and David Ricardo,  as well as Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi's critique of laissez-faire economics and analysis of the precarious state of the proletariat  ,  in particular the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Henri de Saint-Simon, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Charles Fourier
- Earlier German philosophical materialism among the Young Hegelians, particularly that of Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer,  as well as the French materialism of the late 18th century, including Diderot, Claude Adrien Helvétius and d'Holbach
- The working class analysis by Friedrich Engels,  as well as the early descriptions of class provided by French liberals and Saint-Simonians such as François Guizot and Augustin Thierry
- Marx's Judaic legacy has been identified as formative to both his moral outlook  and his materialist philosophy. 
Marx's view of history, which came to be called historical materialism (controversially adapted as the philosophy of dialectical materialism by Engels and Lenin), certainly shows the influence of Hegel's claim that one should view reality (and history) dialectically.  However, Hegel had thought in idealist terms, putting ideas in the forefront, whereas Marx sought to rewrite dialectics in materialist terms, arguing for the primacy of matter over idea.   Where Hegel saw the "spirit" as driving history, Marx saw this as an unnecessary mystification, obscuring the reality of humanity and its physical actions shaping the world.  He wrote that Hegelianism stood the movement of reality on its head, and that one needed to set it upon its feet.  Despite his dislike of mystical terms, Marx used Gothic language in several of his works: in The Communist Manifesto he proclaims "A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre", and in The Capital he refers to capital as "necromancy that surrounds the products of labour". 
Though inspired by French socialist and sociological thought,  Marx criticised utopian socialists, arguing that their favoured small-scale socialistic communities would be bound to marginalisation and poverty and that only a large-scale change in the economic system can bring about real change. 
The other important contributions to Marx's revision of Hegelianism came from Engels's book, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, which led Marx to conceive of the historical dialectic in terms of class conflict and to see the modern working class as the most progressive force for revolution,  as well as from the social democrat Friedrich Wilhelm Schulz, who in Die Bewegung der Produktion described the movement of society as "flowing from the contradiction between the forces of production and the mode of production."  
Marx believed that he could study history and society scientifically and discern tendencies of history and the resulting outcome of social conflicts. Some followers of Marx, therefore, concluded that a communist revolution would inevitably occur. However, Marx famously asserted in the eleventh of his "Theses on Feuerbach" that "philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways the point however is to change it" and he clearly dedicated himself to trying to alter the world.  
Marx's theories inspired several theories and disciplines of future including, but not limited to:
Philosophy and social thought
Marx's polemic with other thinkers often occurred through critique and thus he has been called "the first great user of critical method in social sciences".   He criticised speculative philosophy, equating metaphysics with ideology.  By adopting this approach, Marx attempted to separate key findings from ideological biases.  This set him apart from many contemporary philosophers. 
Like Tocqueville, who described a faceless and bureaucratic despotism with no identifiable despot,  Marx also broke with classical thinkers who spoke of a single tyrant and with Montesquieu, who discussed the nature of the single despot. Instead, Marx set out to analyse "the despotism of capital".  Fundamentally, Marx assumed that human history involves transforming human nature, which encompasses both human beings and material objects.  Humans recognise that they possess both actual and potential selves.   For both Marx and Hegel, self-development begins with an experience of internal alienation stemming from this recognition, followed by a realisation that the actual self, as a subjective agent, renders its potential counterpart an object to be apprehended.  Marx further argues that by moulding nature  in desired ways  the subject takes the object as its own and thus permits the individual to be actualised as fully human. For Marx, the human nature – Gattungswesen, or species-being – exists as a function of human labour.    Fundamental to Marx's idea of meaningful labour is the proposition that for a subject to come to terms with its alienated object it must first exert influence upon literal, material objects in the subject's world.  Marx acknowledges that Hegel "grasps the nature of work and comprehends objective man, authentic because actual, as the result of his own work",  but characterises Hegelian self-development as unduly "spiritual" and abstract.  Marx thus departs from Hegel by insisting that "the fact that man is a corporeal, actual, sentient, objective being with natural capacities means that he has actual, sensuous objects for his nature as objects of his life-expression, or that he can only express his life in actual sensuous objects".  Consequently, Marx revises Hegelian "work" into material "labour" and in the context of human capacity to transform nature the term "labour power". 
Labour, class struggle and false consciousness
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
Marx had a special concern with how people relate to their own labour power.  He wrote extensively about this in terms of the problem of alienation.  As with the dialectic, Marx began with a Hegelian notion of alienation but developed a more materialist conception.  Capitalism mediates social relationships of production (such as among workers or between workers and capitalists) through commodities, including labour, that are bought and sold on the market.  For Marx, the possibility that one may give up ownership of one's own labour – one's capacity to transform the world – is tantamount to being alienated from one's own nature and it is a spiritual loss.  Marx described this loss as commodity fetishism, in which the things that people produce, commodities, appear to have a life and movement of their own to which humans and their behaviour merely adapt. 
Commodity fetishism provides an example of what Engels called "false consciousness",  which relates closely to the understanding of ideology. By "ideology", Marx and Engels meant ideas that reflect the interests of a particular class at a particular time in history, but which contemporaries see as universal and eternal.  Marx and Engels's point was not only that such beliefs are at best half-truths, as they serve an important political function. Put another way, the control that one class exercises over the means of production include not only the production of food or manufactured goods but also the production of ideas (this provides one possible explanation for why members of a subordinate class may hold ideas contrary to their own interests).   An example of this sort of analysis is Marx's understanding of religion, summed up in a passage from the preface  to his 1843 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right:
Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. 
Whereas his Gymnasium senior thesis at the Gymnasium zu Trier [de] argued that religion had as its primary social aim the promotion of solidarity, here Marx sees the social function of religion in terms of highlighting/preserving political and economic status quo and inequality. 
Marx was an outspoken opponent of child labour,  saying that British industries "could but live by sucking blood, and children's blood too", and that U.S. capital was financed by the "capitalized blood of children".  
Economy, history and society
— Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto 
Marx's thoughts on labour were related to the primacy he gave to the economic relation in determining the society's past, present and future (see also economic determinism).    Accumulation of capital shapes the social system.  For Marx, social change was about conflict between opposing interests, driven in the background by economic forces.  This became the inspiration for the body of works known as the conflict theory.  In his evolutionary model of history, he argued that human history began with free, productive and creative work that was over time coerced and dehumanised, a trend most apparent under capitalism.  Marx noted that this was not an intentional process, rather no individual or even state can go against the forces of economy. 
The organisation of society depends on means of production. The means of production are all things required to produce material goods, such as land, natural resources, and technology but not human labour. The relations of production are the social relationships people enter into as they acquire and use the means of production.  Together, these compose the mode of production and Marx distinguished historical eras in terms of modes of production. Marx differentiated between base and superstructure, where the base (or substructure) is the economic system and superstructure is the cultural and political system.  Marx regarded this mismatch between economic base and social superstructure as a major source of social disruption and conflict. 
Despite Marx's stress on the critique of capitalism and discussion of the new communist society that should replace it, his explicit critique is guarded, as he saw it as an improved society compared to the past ones (slavery and feudalism).  Marx never clearly discusses issues of morality and justice, but scholars agree that his work contained implicit discussion of those concepts. 
Marx's view of capitalism was two-sided.   On one hand, in the 19th century's deepest critique of the dehumanising aspects of this system he noted that defining features of capitalism include alienation, exploitation and recurring, cyclical depressions leading to mass unemployment. On the other hand, he characterised capitalism as "revolutionising, industrialising and universalising qualities of development, growth and progressivity" (by which Marx meant industrialisation, urbanisation, technological progress, increased productivity and growth, rationality and scientific revolution) that are responsible for progress.    Marx considered the capitalist class to be one of the most revolutionary in history because it constantly improved the means of production, more so than any other class in history and was responsible for the overthrow of feudalism.   Capitalism can stimulate considerable growth because the capitalist has an incentive to reinvest profits in new technologies and capital equipment. 
According to Marx, capitalists take advantage of the difference between the labour market and the market for whatever commodity the capitalist can produce. Marx observed that in practically every successful industry, input unit-costs are lower than output unit-prices. Marx called the difference "surplus value" and argued that it was based on surplus labour, the difference between what it costs to keep workers alive and what they can produce.  Although Marx describes capitalists as vampires sucking worker's blood,  he notes that drawing profit is "by no means an injustice"  and that capitalists cannot go against the system.  The problem is the "cancerous cell" of capital, understood not as property or equipment, but the relations between workers and owners – the economic system in general. 
At the same time, Marx stressed that capitalism was unstable and prone to periodic crises.  He suggested that over time capitalists would invest more and more in new technologies and less and less in labour.  Since Marx believed that profit derived from surplus value appropriated from labour, he concluded that the rate of profit would fall as the economy grows.  Marx believed that increasingly severe crises would punctuate this cycle of growth and collapse.  Moreover, he believed that in the long-term, this process would enrich and empower the capitalist class and impoverish the proletariat.   In section one of The Communist Manifesto, Marx describes feudalism, capitalism and the role internal social contradictions play in the historical process:
We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged . the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder they were burst asunder. Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted in it, and the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class. A similar movement is going on before our own eyes . The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring order into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. 
Marx believed that those structural contradictions within capitalism necessitate its end, giving way to socialism, or a post-capitalistic, communist society:
The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. 
Thanks to various processes overseen by capitalism, such as urbanisation, the working class, the proletariat, should grow in numbers and develop class consciousness, in time realising that they can and must change the system.   Marx believed that if the proletariat were to seize the means of production, they would encourage social relations that would benefit everyone equally, abolishing exploiting class and introduce a system of production less vulnerable to cyclical crises.  Marx argued in The German Ideology that capitalism will end through the organised actions of an international working class:
Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence. 
In this new society, the alienation would end and humans would be free to act without being bound by the labour market.  It would be a democratic society, enfranchising the entire population.  In such a utopian world, there would also be little need for a state, whose goal was previously to enforce the alienation.  Marx theorised that between capitalism and the establishment of a socialist/communist system, would exist a period of dictatorship of the proletariat – where the working class holds political power and forcibly socialises the means of production.  As he wrote in his Critique of the Gotha Program, "between capitalist and communist society there lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat".  While he allowed for the possibility of peaceful transition in some countries with strong democratic institutional structures (such as Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands), he suggested that in other countries in which workers cannot "attain their goal by peaceful means" the "lever of our revolution must be force". 
Marx viewed Russia as the main counter-revolutionary threat to European revolutions.  During the Crimean War, Marx backed the Ottoman Empire and its allies Britain and France against Russia.  He was absolutely opposed to Pan-Slavism, viewing it as an instrument of Russian foreign policy.  Marx had considered the Slavic nations except Poles as 'counter-revolutionary'. Marx and Engels published in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in February 1849:
To the sentimental phrases about brotherhood which we are being offered here on behalf of the most counter-revolutionary nations of Europe, we reply that hatred of Russians was and still is the primary revolutionary passion among Germans that since the revolution [of 1848] hatred of Czechs and Croats has been added, and that only by the most determined use of terror against these Slav peoples can we, jointly with the Poles and Magyars, safeguard the revolution. We know where the enemies of the revolution are concentrated, viz. in Russia and the Slav regions of Austria, and no fine phrases, no allusions to an undefined democratic future for these countries can deter us from treating our enemies as enemies. Then there will be a struggle, an "inexorable life-and-death struggle", against those Slavs who betray the revolution an annihilating fight and ruthless terror – not in the interests of Germany, but in the interests of the revolution!" 
Marx and Engels sympathised with the Narodnik revolutionaries of the 1860s and 1870s. When the Russian revolutionaries assassinated Tsar Alexander II of Russia, Marx expressed the hope that the assassination foreshadowed 'the formation of a Russian commune'.  Marx supported the Polish uprisings against tsarist Russia.  He said in a speech in London in 1867:
In the first place the policy of Russia is changeless. Its methods, its tactics, its manoeuvres may change, but the polar star of its policy – world domination – is a fixed star. In our times only a civilised government ruling over barbarian masses can hatch out such a plan and execute it. . There is but one alternative for Europe. Either Asiatic barbarism, under Muscovite direction, will burst around its head like an avalanche, or else it must re-establish Poland, thus putting twenty million heroes between itself and Asia and gaining a breathing spell for the accomplishment of its social regeneration. 
Marx supported the cause of Irish independence. In 1867, he wrote Engels: "I used to think the separation of Ireland from England impossible. I now think it inevitable. The English working class will never accomplish anything until it has got rid of Ireland. . English reaction in England had its roots . in the subjugation of Ireland." 
Marx spent some time in French Algeria, which had been invaded and made a French colony in 1830, and had the opportunity to observe life in colonial North Africa. He wrote about the colonial justice system, in which "a form of torture has been used (and this happens 'regularly') to extract confessions from the Arabs naturally it is done (like the English in India) by the 'police' the judge is supposed to know nothing at all about it."  Marx was surprised by the arrogance of many European settlers in Algiers and wrote in a letter: "when a European colonist dwells among the 'lesser breeds,' either as a settler or even on business, he generally regards himself as even more inviolable than handsome William I [a Prussian king]. Still, when it comes to bare-faced arrogance and presumptuousness vis-à-vis the 'lesser breeds,' the British and Dutch outdo the French." 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Marx's analysis of colonialism as a progressive force bringing modernization to a backward feudal society sounds like a transparent rationalization for foreign domination. His account of British domination, however, reflects the same ambivalence that he shows towards capitalism in Europe. In both cases, Marx recognizes the immense suffering brought about during the transition from feudal to bourgeois society while insisting that the transition is both necessary and ultimately progressive. He argues that the penetration of foreign commerce will cause a social revolution in India." 
Marx discussed British colonial rule in India in the New York Herald Tribune in June 1853:
There cannot remain any doubt but that the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan [India] is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindostan had to suffer before. England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing. [however], we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition.  
Marx's ideas have had a profound impact on world politics and intellectual thought.     Followers of Marx have often debated among themselves over how to interpret Marx's writings and apply his concepts to the modern world.  The legacy of Marx's thought has become contested between numerous tendencies, each of which sees itself as Marx's most accurate interpreter. In the political realm, these tendencies include Leninism, Marxism–Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism, Luxemburgism and libertarian Marxism.  Various currents have also developed in academic Marxism, often under influence of other views, resulting in structuralist Marxism, historical Marxism, phenomenological Marxism, analytical Marxism and Hegelian Marxism. 
From an academic perspective, Marx's work contributed to the birth of modern sociology. He has been cited as one of the 19th century's three masters of the "school of suspicion" alongside Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud  and as one of the three principal architects of modern social science along with Émile Durkheim and Max Weber.  In contrast to other philosophers, Marx offered theories that could often be tested with the scientific method.  Both Marx and Auguste Comte set out to develop scientifically justified ideologies in the wake of European secularisation and new developments in the philosophies of history and science. Working in the Hegelian tradition, Marx rejected Comtean sociological positivism in an attempt to develop a science of society.  Karl Löwith considered Marx and Søren Kierkegaard to be the two greatest Hegelian philosophical successors.  In modern sociological theory, Marxist sociology is recognised as one of the main classical perspectives. Isaiah Berlin considers Marx the true founder of modern sociology "in so far as anyone can claim the title".  Beyond social science, he has also had a lasting legacy in philosophy, literature, the arts and the humanities.    
Social theorists of the 20th and 21st centuries have pursued two main strategies in response to Marx. One move has been to reduce it to its analytical core, known as analytical Marxism. Another, more common move has been to dilute the explanatory claims of Marx's social theory and emphasise the "relative autonomy" of aspects of social and economic life not directly related to Marx's central narrative of interaction between the development of the "forces of production" and the succession of "modes of production". This has been the neo-Marxist theorising adopted by historians inspired by Marx's social theory such as E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm. It has also been a line of thinking pursued by thinkers and activists such as Antonio Gramsci who have sought to understand the opportunities and the difficulties of transformative political practice, seen in the light of Marxist social theory.     Marx's ideas would also have a profound influence on subsequent artists and art history, with avant-garde movements across literature, visual art, music, film, and theatre. 
Politically, Marx's legacy is more complex. Throughout the 20th century, revolutions in dozens of countries labelled themselves "Marxist"—most notably the Russian Revolution, which led to the founding of the Soviet Union.  Major world leaders including Vladimir Lenin,  Mao Zedong,  Fidel Castro,  Salvador Allende,  Josip Broz Tito,  Kwame Nkrumah,  Jawaharlal Nehru,  Nelson Mandela,  Xi Jinping,  Jean-Claude Juncker   and Thomas Sankara [ citation needed ] have all cited Marx as an influence. Beyond where Marxist revolutions took place, Marx's ideas have informed political parties worldwide.  In countries associated with some Marxist claims, some events have led political opponents to blame Marx for millions of deaths,  but the fidelity of these varied revolutionaries, leaders and parties to Marx's work is highly contested and has been rejected,  including by many Marxists.  It is now common to distinguish between the legacy and influence of Marx specifically and the legacy and influence of those who have shaped his ideas for political purposes.  Andrew Lipow describes Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels as "the founders of modern revolutionary democratic socialism." 
Marx remains both relevant and controversial. In May 2018, to mark the bicentenary of his birth, a 4.5m statue of him by leading Chinese sculptor Wu Weishan and donated by the Chinese government was unveiled in his birthplace of Trier. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker defended Marx's memory, saying that today Marx "stands for things which he is not responsible for and which he didn't cause because many of the things he wrote down were redrafted into the opposite".   In 2017, a feature film, titled The Young Karl Marx, featuring Marx, his wife Jenny Marx and Engels, among other revolutionaries and intellectuals prior to the Revolutions of 1848, received good reviews for both its historical accuracy and its brio in dealing with intellectual life. 
6. Other Revolution Claims and Examples
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1861) remarked that &ldquoRevolutions never follow precedents nor furnish them.&rdquo Given the unpredictability, the nonlinearity, the seeming uniqueness of revolutions, whether political or scientific, it is therefore surprising to find Thomas Kuhn attempting to provide a General Theory of Scientific Revolutions (Kindi 2005). Early Kuhn did seem to believe that there is a single, underlying pattern to the development of mature sciences that is key to their success, and late Kuhn a different pattern. Has either early or late Kuhn found such a pattern, or has he imposed his own philosophical structure on the vagaries and vicissitudes of history? Kuhn&rsquos Kantianism always did live in tension with his historicism, and in his late work (e.g., 2000c) he surprisingly gave up the pretense of deriving his pattern of taxonomic change and speciation from history of science, on the ground that it largely followed &ldquofrom first principles.&rdquo
Numerous philosophers, scientists, and other commentators have made claims about scientific change that differ from Kuhn&rsquos. (For a recent selection see Soler et al. 2008.) Some, as we have seen, are skeptical of revolution talk altogether, others of Kuhn&rsquos in particular. Still others accept that some revolutions are Kuhnian but deny that all of them are. One common criticism is that not all revolutionary advances are preceded by an acute crisis, that is, by major failures of preceding research. Kuhn himself allowed for exceptions already in Structure. Another is that revolutionary changes need not involve discontinuities in all of Kuhn&rsquos levels at once (especially Laudan 1984). Yet another is that there need be little logical or linguistic discontinuity. A rapid, seemingly transformative change in research practices may involve simply a marked gain in data accessibility or accuracy or computational processing ability via new instrumentation or experimental design. And on the later Kuhn&rsquos own view, revolution need not be a game of creative destruction. Only a few examples can be considered here.
6.1 Some Alternative Conceptions of Scientific Revolution
Do revolutions consist, according to Kuhn, of major new materials (experimental facts, theories, models, instruments, techniques) entering a scientific domain or, instead, of a major restructuring or rearrangement of materials, practices, and community affiliations already present? Kuhn states that the relativity revolution might serve as
The reader may find this claim confusing, however, because in the just-preceding paragraphs Kuhn had emphasized the ontological and conceptual changes of precisely this revolution, e.g., the radical change in the concept of mass. Einstein&rsquos masses are not Newtonian masses, he insisted. They are newly introduced entities hence, we may infer, new content. Yet Kuhn surely does have a point worth saving, in that relativity theory still deals with most of the same kinds of phenomena and problems as classical mechanics and employs immediate successors to the classical concepts. But, if so, then reorganization of familiar materials implies a disciplinary continuity through revolution that Kuhn minimized.
That reorganization dominates Kuhn&rsquos conception of revolutions is apparent throughout his work. As a young scholar he had an epiphany when Aristotle&rsquos seemingly radically false or unintelligible claims suddenly came together for him as a coherent, comprehensive worldview. This experience became Kuhn&rsquos psychological model for revolutionary transformation from one paradigm to its successor and informed his later talk of Gestalt switches. But he also emphasized that revolution involves social reorganization of the field (not merely the cognitive reorganization of an individual), from one form of scientific life to another, incompatible with it. By implication, his structural or formal conception of revolution excluded the alternative idea of revolution as extraordinary bursts in substantive content.
In Conceptual Revolutions, Paul Thagard (1992) retains something of Kuhn&rsquos idea of conceptual transformation and the more specific idea of taxonomic transformation. He distinguishes two kinds of reclassification, in terms of the language of tree structures used in computer science: branch jumping and tree switching. Branch jumping reclassifies or relocates something to another branch of the same tree, e.g., reclassifying the whale as a mammal rather than a fish, the earth as a planet, or Brownian motion as a physical rather than a biological phenomenon. New branches can appear and old branches can be eliminated. Meanwhile, tree switching replaces an entire classification tree by a different tree structure based on different principles of classification, as when Darwin replaced the static classification tree of Linnaeus by one based on evolutionary genealogy and when Mendeleev replaced alternative classification systems of the chemical elements by his own table. Taking a computational approach to philosophy of science, Thagard employs his computer program ECHO to reconstruct and evaluate several historical cases of alleged conceptual revolution and arrives at a tamer conception of revolutionary breaks than Kuhn&rsquos.
The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen (2006) also devotes a good deal of attention to cognition and categorization issues, in a defense of the later Kuhn&rsquos approach. The work of cognitive psychologist Lawrence Barsalou and of philosopher-historian Nancy Nersessian (the founder of the &ldquocognitive historical&rdquo approach to science) plays a significant role in their account. Nersessian herself (2003, 2008) emphasizes model-based reasoning. These are no longer static cases or exemplars, for they possess an internal dynamic.
Howard Margolis (1993) distinguishes two kinds of revolutions, depending on which kinds of problems they solve. Those revolutions that bridge gaps, he contends, differ from those that surmount or penetrate or somehow evade barriers. His focus is on barriers, a neglected topic even though it fits Kuhn&rsquos account of cognition well. Margolis develops Kuhnian themes in terms of deeply ingrained &ldquohabits of mind.&rdquo While such habits are necessary for efficient scientific work within any specialty discipline, they constitute barriers to alternative conceptions. More broadly, deeply ingrained cultural habits of mind can close off opportunities that, according to the perspective of later generations, were staring them in the face. Margolis is struck by the apparent fact that all the materials for Copernicus&rsquo new model of the solar system had been available, in scattered form, for centuries. No new gap-crossing developments were needed. He concludes that, rather than a gap to be bridged, the problem was a cognitive barrier that needed to be removed, a barrier that blocked expert mathematical astronomers from bringing together, as mutually relevant, what turned out to be the crucial premises, and then linking them in the tight way that Copernicus did. If Margolis&rsquo account of the Copernican Revolution is correct, it provides an example of revolution as holistic reorganization of available materials, hence the non-piecemeal, noncumulative nature of revolutions. The developments that lead to a barrier&rsquos removal can be minor and, as in the case of Copernicus, even quite peripheral to the primary subject matter that they ultimately help to transform. Here one thinks of a model popular with mystery writers, where an everyday observation leads to a sudden change in perspective.
Davis Baird (2004) contends that there can be revolutions in practice that are not conceptual revolutions. He emphasizes the knowledge embodied in skills and in instruments themselves. His central example is analytic chemistry.
Recently, Rogier De Langhe (2012, 2014a and b, 2017) has been developing a broadly Kuhnian, two-process account of science from an economics standpoint. Instead of doing a series of historical cases, De Langhe and colleagues are developing algorithms to detect subtle patterns in the large citation databases now available. De Langue employs economic arguments to illuminate such themes as the division of cognitive labor, models of scientific progress, and scientists&rsquo decisions about whether to specialize or to innovate.
6.2 Some Biological Cases
The account of the dynamics of science in Structure ill fit the rapid splitting and recombining of fields in the post-World War II era of Big Science, as Kuhn recognized. So he excluded from his account the division and recombination of already mature fields such as happened with the emergence of biochemistry. (This exclusion is troubling, given the universal thrust of his account. It is as if Kuhn admitted that his account applies only to a particular historical period that is now largely past yet he also wrote as if the normal-revolutionary model would apply to mature disciplines into the long future.) In his later work he did devote careful attention to the division of fields into specialties and subspecialties (see §5). However, he still gave little attention to the more-or-less reverse process of new fields coming into existence by combinations of previously distinct fields as well as to cross- and trans-disciplinary research, in which a variety of different specialists somehow succeed in working together (Galison 1997, Kellert 2008, Andersen 2013).
And what can we make, on Kuhn&rsquos account, of the explosion of work in molecular biology following the Watson-Crick discovery, in 1953, of the chemical structure of DNA and the development of better laboratory equipment and techniques? Molecular genetics quickly grew into the very general field of molecular biology. Less than two decades after Watson and Crick, Gunther Stent could already write in his 1971 textbook:
There is something paradigmatic about molecular biology and also something revolutionary about its rapid progress and expansion. It is not clear how to characterize this and similar developments. Was this a Kuhnian revolution? It did involve major social and intellectual reorganization, one that conflicted with the previous ones in some respects but without undermining the Darwinian paradigm. Quite the contrary. Or is molecular biology more like a style of scientific practice than a paradigm? Such an explosive development as molecular biology hardly fits Kuhn&rsquos description of steady, normal scientific articulation of the new paradigm by puzzle solving. Instead, it seems better to regard it as a large toolkit of methods or techniques applicable to several specialty fields rather than as an integrative theory-framework within one field.
Should we then focus on practices rather than on integrative theories in our interpretation of Kuhnian paradigms? The trouble with this move is that practices can also change so rapidly that it is tempting to speak of revolutionary transformations of scientific work even though there is little change in the overarching theoretical framework (see Part II of Soler et al. 2008). Moreover, as Baird (2004) points out, the rapid replacement of old practices by new is often a product of efficiency rather than intellectual incompatibility. Why continue to do gene sequencing by hand when automated processing in now available? Replacement can also be a product of change in research style, given that, as Kuhn already recognized, scientific communities are cultural communities.
Similar points can be made about the rise of statistical physics, mentioned above in relation to Hacking&rsquos work. (See also Brush 1983 and Porter 1986.) This was an explosion of work within the classical mechanical paradigm rather than a slow, puzzle-by-puzzle articulation of precisely that paradigm in its own previous terms. Or was it? For Kuhn himself recognized that modern mathematical physics only came into existence starting around 1850 and that Maxwellian electrodynamics was a major departure from the strictly Newtonian paradigm. In any case, there was much resistance among physicists to the new style of reasoning. The kinetic theory of gases quickly grew into statistical mechanics, which leapt the boundaries of its initial specialty field. New genres as well as new styles of mathematical-physical thinking quickly replaced old&mdashand displaced the old generation of practitioners. Yet on Kuhn&rsquos official theory of science it was all just &ldquoclassical mechanics.&rdquo
Furthermore, the biological and chemical sciences do not readily invite a Kuhnian analysis, given the usual, theory-centered interpretation of Kuhn. For biological fields rarely produce lawful theories of the kind supposedly found in physics. Indeed, it is controversial whether there exist distinctly biological laws at all. And yet the biological sciences have advanced so rapidly that their development cries out for the label &lsquorevolutionary&rsquo.
What of the emerging field of evolutionary-developmental biology (evo-devo)? It is too soon to know whether future work in this accelerating field will merely complete evolutionary biology rather than displacing it. It does seem unlikely that it will amount to a complete, revolutionary overturning of the Darwinian paradigm. (Kuhn might reply that the discovery of homeobox genes overturned a smaller paradigm based on the expectation that the genetic makeup of different orders of organisms would have little in common at the relevant level of description.) And if it complements the Darwinian paradigm, then evo-devo is, again, surely too big and too rapidly advancing to be considered a mere, piecemeal, puzzle-solving articulation of that paradigm. Based on work to date, evo-devo biologist Sean B. Carroll, for example, holds precisely the complement view&mdashcomplementary yet revolutionary:
6.3 Nonlinear Dynamics
Kuhn treated a scientific field (and perhaps science as a whole) as a system with a far more interesting internal dynamics than either Popper or the logical empiricists had proposed. The famous opening paragraphs of Structure read as though Kuhn had analyzed a historical time series and extracted a pattern from it inductively as the basis for his model of scientific development. The broadly cyclic nature of this pattern immediately jumps out at dynamical systems theorists. Yet despite this perhaps promising start as an early dynamical modeler of science, Kuhn apparently paid little attention to the explosion of work in nonlinear dynamics that began with &ldquochaos&rdquo theory and widened into such areas as complex adaptive systems and network theory. This is unfortunate, since the new developments might have provided valuable tools for articulating his own ideas.
For example, it would appear that, as Kuhnian normal science becomes more robust in the sense of closing gaps, tightening connections, and thereby achieving multiple lines of derivation and hence mutual reinforcement of many results. However, that very fact makes normal science increasingly fragile, less resilient to shocks, and more vulnerable to cascading failure (Nickles 2008). Kuhn claimed, contrary to the expectations of scientific realists, that there would be no end to scientific revolutions in ongoing, mature sciences, with no reason to believe that such revolutions would gradually diminish in size as these sciences continued to mature. But it would seem to follow from his model that he could have made a still stronger point. For Kuhn&rsquos position in Structure arguably implies that, when considering a single field over time, future revolutions can occasionally be even larger than before. The reason is that just mentioned: as research continues filling gaps and further articulating the paradigm, normal science becomes more tightly integrated but also forges tighter links to relevant neighboring fields. Taking these developments into account predicts that Kuhnian normal science should evolve toward an ever more critical state in which something that was once an innocuous anomaly can now trigger a cascade of failures (Nickles 2012a and b), sometimes rather quickly. For there will be little slack left to absorb such discrepancies. If so, then we have an important sort of dynamical nonlinearity even in normal science, which means that Kuhnian normal science itself is more dynamic, less static, than he made it out to be.
It seems clear that Kuhnian revolutions are bifurcations in the nonlinear dynamical sense, and it seems plausible to think that Kuhnian revolutions may have a fat-tailed or power-law distribution (or worse) when their size is plotted over time on an appropriate scale. Each of these features is a &ldquohallmark of nonlinear dynamics&rdquo (Hooker 2011A, 5 2011B, 850, 858). To elaborate a bit: one intriguing suggestion coming from work in nonlinear dynamics is that scientific changes may be like earthquakes and many other phenomena (perhaps including punctuated equilibrium events of the Gould-Eldredge sort as well as mass extinction events in biology) in following a power-law distribution in which there are exponentially fewer changes of a given magnitude than the number of changes in the next lower category. For example, there might be only one magnitude 5 change (or above) for every ten magnitude 4 changes (on average over time), as in the Gutenberg-Richter scale for earthquakes. If so, then scientific revolutions would be scale free, meaning that large revolutions in the future are more probable than a Gaussian normal distribution would predict. Such a conclusion would have important implications for the issue of scientific realism.
To be sure, working out such a timescale of revolutions and their sizes in the history of science would be difficult and controversial, but Nicholas Rescher (1978, 2006) has begun the task in terms of ranking scientific discoveries and studying their distribution over time. Derek Price (1963) had previously introduced quantitative historical considerations into history of science, pointing out, among many other things, the exponential increase in the number of scientists and quantity of their publications since the Scientific Revolution. Such an exponential increase, faster than world population increase, obviously cannot continue forever and, in fact, was already beginning to plateau in industrialized nations in the 1960s. Among philosophers, Rescher was probably the first to analyze aggregate data concerning scientific innovation, arguing that, as research progresses, discoveries of a given magnitude become more difficult. Rescher concludes that we must eventually expect a decrease in the rate of discovery of a given magnitude and hence, presumably, a similar decrease in the rate of scientific revolutions. Although he does not mention Schumpeter in this work, he expresses a similar view:
This broadly Kuhnian position position on the number and magnitude of revolutions contrasts sharply with Butterfield&rsquos, who saw revolutions only as founding revolutions, and also with that of those epistemological realists who grant that revolutionary conceptual and practical changes have occurred but who believe that they will become successively smaller in the future as science approaches the true theory. Kuhn&rsquos own later position, in which specialties are insulated from one another by taxonomic incommensurability, presents us with a somewhat less integrated conception of science and thus one less subject to large-scale revolutionary disruption. Since we can regard scientific practices and organization as highly designed technological systems, the work of Charles Perrow and others on technological risk is relevant here. (See Perrow 1984 for entry into this approach.)
Margolis (1993) notes the importance of the phenomenon of &ldquocontagion,&rdquo in which new ideas or practices suddenly reach a kind of social tipping point and spread rapidly. Contagion is, of course, necessary for a revolt to succeed as a revolution. Today, contagion is a topic being studied carefully by network theorists and popularized by Malcolm Gladwell&rsquos The Tipping Point (2000). Steven Strogatz, Duncan Watts, and Albert-László Barabási are among the new breed of network theorists who are developing technical accounts of &ldquophase changes&rdquo resulting from the growth and reorganization of networks, including social networks of science&mdasha topic dear to the early Kuhn&rsquos heart as he struggled with the themes of Structure (see Strogatz, 2003, chap. 10 Watts 1999 Newman 2001 Barabási 2002 Buchanan 2002).
Does the emergence to prominence of &ldquochaos theory&rdquo (nonlinear dynamics) itself constitute a scientific revolution and, if so, is it a distinctly Kuhnian revolution? In recent years several writers, including both scientists and science writers, have attempted to link Kuhn&rsquos idea of revolutionary paradigm shifts to the emergence of chaos theory, complexity theory, and network theory (e.g., Gleick 1987, chap. 2, on the chaos theory revolution Ruelle 1991, chap. 11 Jen in Cowan et al. 1999, 622f, on complexity theory and Buchanan 2002, 47, on network theory). Interestingly, some authors reapply these ideas to Kuhn&rsquos account itself, theoretically construing revolutionary paradigm shifts as phase changes or as nonlinear jumps from one strange attractor or one sort of network structure to another.
Steven Kellert (1993) considers and rejects the claim that chaos theory represents a Kuhnian revolution. Although it does provide a new set of research problems and standards and, to some degree, transforms our worldview, it does not overturn and replace an entrenched theory. Kellert argues that chaos theory does not even constitute the emergence of a new, mature science rather than an extension of standard mechanics, although it may constitute a new style of reasoning.
Kellert&rsquos position hangs partly on how we construe theories. If a theory is just a toolbox of models, something like an integrated collection of Kuhnian exemplars (Giere 1988, Teller 2008), then the claim for a revolutionary theory development of some kind becomes more plausible. For nonlinear dynamics highlights a new set of models and the strange attractors that characterize their behaviors. In addition, complex systems theorists often stress the holistic, anti-reductive, emergent nature of the systems they study, by contrast with the linear, Newtonian paradigm. Kuhn wrote that one way in which normal science articulates its paradigm is by &ldquopermitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn attention.&rdquo But had not classical dynamics suppressed rather than drawn attention to the problems of chaos theory and the various sorts of complexity theory and network theory that are much studied today? Still, it is easy to agree with Kellert that this case does not fit Kuhn&rsquos account neatly. To some readers it suggests that a more pluralistic conception of scientific revolutions than Kuhn&rsquos is needed.
Kellert also questions whether traditional dynamics was really in a special state of crisis prior to the recent emphasis on nonlinear dynamics, for difficulties in dealing with nonlinear phenomena have been apparent almost from the beginning. Since Kuhn himself emphasized, against Popper, that all theories face anomalies at all times, it is unfortunately all too easy, after an apparently revolutionary development, to point back and claim crisis.
6.4 The Essential Tension between Tradition and Innovation
Kuhn&rsquos work called attention to what he called &ldquothe essential tension&rdquo between tradition and innovation (Kuhn 1959, 1977a). While he initially claimed that his model applied only to mature natural sciences such as physics, chemistry, and parts of biology, he believed that the essential tension point applies, in varying degrees, to all enterprises that place a premium on creative innovation. His work thereby raises interesting questions, such as which kinds of social structures make revolution necessary (by contrast with more continuous varieties of transformative change) and whether those that do experience revolutions tend to be more progressive by some standard.
Some analysts agree that casting the net more widely might shed comparative light on scientific change, and that Kuhn&rsquos model is too restrictive even when applied only to the mature sciences. We have already met several alternative conceptions of transformative change in the sciences. Kuhn believed that innovation in the arts was often too divergent fully to express the essential tension. By contrast, the sciences, he claimed, do not seek innovation for its own sake, at least normal scientists do not.
But what about technological innovation (which is often closely related to mature science) and what about business enterprise more generally? There are, of course, important differences between the products of basic scientific research and commercial products and services, but there are enough similarities to make comparison worthwhile&mdashthe more so with today&rsquos emphasis on translational science. And in the sciences as well as economic life there would seem to be other forms of displacement than the logical and epistemological forms commonly recognized by philosophers of science. Consider the familiar economic phenomenon of obsolescence, including cases that lead to major social reorganization as technological systems are improved. Think of algorithmic data mining and statistical computation, robotics, and the automation to be found in any modern biological laboratory. In The Innovator&rsquos Dilemma (1997), economist Clayton Christensen denies that major technological breakthroughs are either necessary or sufficient for disruptive innovation. In that and later work he distinguishes sustaining technologies that make incremental improvements of a company&rsquos sales leaders from two kinds of disruptive technologies. &ldquoNew-market disruptions&rdquo appeal to a previously non-existent market, whereas &ldquolow-market&rdquo or &ldquolow-end disruptions&rdquo provide simpler and cheaper ways to do things than do the leading products and services. Such companies can sometimes scale up their more efficient processes to displace the major players, as did Japanese steel makers to the big U.S. corporations. There would seem to be parallels in the history of science.
Speaking of technological developments, philosophers, including Kuhn, have undervalued a major source of transformative developments, namely, material culture, specifically the development of new instruments. There is, however, a growing literature in history and sociology of science and technology. A good example is Andy Pickering&rsquos discussion of the conception and construction of the large cloud chamber at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (Pickering 1995). Pickering&rsquos Constructing Quarks (1984), Peter Galison&rsquos How Experiments End (1987) and Image and Logic (1997), and Sharon Traweek&rsquos Beamtimes and Lifetimes (1988) describe the cultures that grew up around the big machines and big theories of high-energy physics in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. As he himself recognized, Kuhn&rsquos model of rapid change runs into increasing difficulty with the Big Science of the World War II era and beyond. But a similar point extends to smaller-scale material practices as documented by much recent research, as in Baird (2004), discussed above. One line of fruitful investigation has been that of the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) program of Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker (see Bijker et al. 1987 and a good deal of later work). Such work takes place on all scales.
In Structure and later writings, Kuhn locates revolutionary change both at the logico-semantical and methodological level (incompatibility between successor and predecessor paradigm) and at the level of form of community life and practice. But does the latter always require the former? Perhaps expressions such as &ldquothe problem of conceptual change&rdquo and &ldquobreaking out of the old conceptual framework&rdquo have led philosophers to over-intellectualize historical change. As we know from the history of economics and business, one form of life can replace another in various ways without being based directly upon a logical or semantic incompatibility. The old ways may be not wrong but simply obsolete, inefficient, out of fashion&mdashdestroyed by a process that requires more resources than simple logical relations to understand it. There can be massive displacement by non-logical means. Many have argued that Kuhn&rsquos semantic holism, with its logical-relational underpinnings, led him to underappreciate how flexible scientists and technologists can be at the frontiers of research (Galison 1997). Having distinguished the working scientists&rsquo point of view from those of the historian and the philosopher, looking down from above, he proceeded to confuse them. Retrospectively, as many commentators have noted, we can view Kuhn on scientific revolutions as a transitional figure, more indebted to logical empiricist conceptions of logic, language, and meaning than he could have recognized at the time, while departing sharply from the logical empiricists and Popper in other respects.
Reviews & endorsements
"[T]his is an astonishingly amazing book, truly revolutionary in modern philosophy about what it is really about, namely, in Walsh's words, "the luminosity of existence," a wonderfully philosophic expression."
- James V. Schall, Georgetown University
“My encounter with The Modern Philosophical Revolution has been one of the most formative experiences in my life as a philosopher. I have no hesitation in placing it along with Bernard Lonergan’s Insight and Eric Voegelin’s Order and History as one of the greatest works in contemporary English–language philosophy, and I predict its French and German translations will follow even more rapidly than did those of Lonergan’s and Voegelin’s opera magna.”
Brendan Purcell, Dublin, Ireland, The Review of Metaphysics
Marx's French sons-in-law
Despite Marx's personal dislike of Frenchmen, all three of his daughters fell in love with French men: Jenny Marx married Charles Longuet, Laura Marx married Paul Lafargue and at age 16, Eleanor fell in love with Henri Lissagaray but was forbidden by Marx to marry him, later marrying the Englishman Edward Aveling !
See the Paul Lafargue Archive .
The First International in France
When the First International was founded in 1864, its contacts in France were Proudhonists, who wanted to confine the International to study groups reading the works of Proudhon. Later the French section expanded and was a participant in the Commune.
See First International History Archive .
After the fall of the Paris Commune, France became the centre of opposition to Marx within the International from Anarchists.
See The Conflict with Bakunin .
World Wide Web
Discussed by Professor John Naughton of the Public Understanding of Technology, Open University
In less than two decades the web has gone from zero to hundreds of billions of pages (nobody knows how many), enabled everyone to become a publisher or broadcaster, brought the Louvre to your laptop and made it much, much harder to keep secrets. Tim Berners-Lee, who invented the World Wide Web more or less single-handedly in 1989-90, is our Gutenberg. Gutenberg invented printing by movable type in 1455, undermining the authority of the Catholic church, fuelling the Reformation, enabling the rise of modern science and shaping our world. The web is a technology of comparable reach and scope. Trying to assess the long-term significance of the web is like trying to forecast the impact of printing in 1475. Come back in 300 years and we'll know more.