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First Battle of Kernstown, 23 March1862

First Battle of Kernstown, 23 March1862

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Map - First Battle of Kernstown, 23 March 1862

Map showing the First Battle of Kernstown, 23 March1862.

Caption reads: Based upon the maps in the "Official Records," Vol. XII., Part I., pp.362-365. A represents the first position of Kimball's and Sullivan's brigades on the morning of March 23d. Sullivan remained to hold the Union left, while Kimball moved to the position at B, and finally to the main battle-field, F (evening of March 23d), where he joined Tyler, who had previously been in position first a C, and then at D, whence he advanced to oppose Stonewall Jackson in his flanking position at F, to which Jackson had marched by wood roads from his first position at E.

Map taken from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: II: North to Antietam, p.307

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First Battle of Kernstown

For ten hours on March 23, 1862, 10,000 Americans from North and South battled each other on the rolling terrain three miles south of Winchester at Kernstown. That struggle, on the first Sunday in spring, marked the first military contest ever waged in the Shenandoah Valley.

Stationed in the Shenandoah Valley with headquarters in Winchester since November of 1861, Jackson’s command—an independent division in Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s Department of Northern Virginia—numbered 10,000 soldiers on New Year’s Day of 1862. Illnesses, re-assignments, and furloughs reduced Jackson’s ranks below 4,000 effectives by the first days of March. As Union divisions closed in on Winchester from the north and east, Jackson was forced to retreat from Winchester on March 11, pulling his division back nearly forty miles to the hamlet of Mount Jackson.

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, leading the Fifth Corps of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, seized Winchester on March 12 and made the city his base of operations for the two divisions—nearly 20,000 troops—that comprised his command. Four days later Banks received orders from the U.S. War Department in Washington to send one of his divisions out of the Shenandoah Valley to provide support for McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign. Banks remained in Winchester with the Second Division of the Fifth Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. James Shields, a former U.S. Senator and Mexican War veteran who camped most of his command two miles north of the town. Banks’ First Division slowly departed from Winchester’s environs on March 21, heading east toward Snicker’s Gap in the Blue Ridge.

Valley residents loyal to the Confederacy discerned the eastward movement of half of the Fifth Corps and—not seeing Shields’ division—erroneously believed that Banks was evacuating the Valley. These citizens relayed this faulty intelligence to Stonewall Jackson who on March 21 had already begun to march his small division northward on the Valley Pike, a ninety-mile long and twenty-two foot wide macadamized turnpike connecting Winchester in the lower Valley with Staunton in the upper Valley. Jackson moved to comply with instructions from Gen. Johnston to keep Union troops in the Valley to prevent them from reinforcing McClellan. By the close of March 22 Jackson bivouacked near Cedar Creek, fifteen miles south of Winchester.

Late on the afternoon of March 22 a skirmish was fought on the southern outskirts of Winchester when Jackson’s cavalry and horse artillery, commanded by Col. Turner Ashby, charged northward on the Valley Pike against a Union outpost near a section of mills. Shields quickly moved artillery and infantry against Ashby’s 290 horse soldiers and three-gun battery, driving him away within an hour while suffering just two casualties—one killed and another wounded. The wounded soldier was Shields, who suffered a broken arm and injured side by shrapnel from a Confederate shell. Driven back to Newtown (present-day Stephens City), Ashby continued to believe that only a few Union regiments remained at Winchester and sent a courier back to Jackson for reinforcements to overtake the town.

Around 7 a.m. the following morning Jackson marched his Valley Army from Cedar Creek north to Winchester. He provided Ashby with four companies of infantry from the Stonewall Brigade. Ashby, waiting half way between Jackson and Winchester, received the infantry companies and also moved toward Winchester. Sighting Union troops on the heights near the Valley Pike hamlet of Kernstown, Ashby ordered his horse artillery to unlimber in the tiny village where they fired at the blue-clad infantry at 9 a.m. on Sunday, March 23, 1862—the first shot fired at the Battle of Kernstown.

For five hours the opposing artilleries dueled while Ashby’s 450 cavalry, infantry, and artillery attempted to advance toward Winchester from the eastern side of the Valley Pike. Within ninety minutes, realizing he was outmanned by a larger Union force concentrated between Kernstown and Winchester, Ashby retreated south of Kernstown. The force was commanded by Col. Nathan Kimball, the leader of Shields’ First Brigade who also handled division duties while Shields lay incapacitated in the Seevers’ house in Winchester. In order to drive Ashby back, Kimball ordered the Second Brigade, four available regiments commanded by Col. Jeremiah C. Sullivan, supported by several companies from three regiments of his own brigade and a two-gun section of Battery B, 1st Virginia (U.S.), which had unlimbered on the Valley Pike, to oppose the three cannon of Confederate horse artillery.

Col. Kimball established his headquarters atop Pritchard’s Hill, a triangular-peaked knoll north of Kernstown and immediately west of the Valley Pike. By 10:30 a.m., sixteen Union cannon from three batteries crowned the military crest of the hill, supported by approximately 800 infantrymen available from three regiments. Instructed twice via dispatches from the incapacitated Shields to give up the high ground and chase down the Confederate cavalry, Kimball ignored both messages, ostensibly believing more Southern infantry was close behind the foot soldiers already with Ashby. If this was his reason, it was a wise one, for shortly after noon he could discern the movements of more Confederate soldiers arriving from the south and into an expanse of leafless woods two miles in front of Pritchard’s Hill.

These reinforcing Confederates were the remainder of Jackson’s division, escorted by Stonewall himself. Jackson decided to press the fight, believing the previously received misinformation that Winchester was held by a very small force. He conducted a too-brief reconnaissance to fortify this erroneous belief. Kimball had deployed two of his three brigades against Ashby in the morning, a total of 4,000 infantry and artillerymen—a force already larger than the 3,700 soldiers Jackson would deploy on the contested field. Another Union brigade was advancing south through Winchester at noon, but was more than an hour away from adding its strength to Kimball’s Pritchard’s Hill defense.

Jackson detached all of his batteries from their respective brigades and held them in reserve on the Valley Pike, one mile south of Kernstown, where they were supported by three of his available infantry regiments. He ordered the remaining six regiments north through the woods to the junction of the tree line and a road that ran westward in front of the woods, 1,200 yards southwest of the Union artillery on Pritchard’s Hill. There, Jackson ordered Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson to “turn a battery” on the hill with his two regiments, apparently meaning to flank the Union artillery to force a reorientation of their position. Shortly after Fulkerson crossed the road and marched his 600 Virginia infantry toward the hill, Jackson sent orders for the next brigade commander to support Fulkerson’s movements. This was Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett, the Stonewall Brigade commander, who had four of the five regiments at his disposal. Garnett ordered the 33rd Virginia forward, following behind Fulkerson’s two regiments (the 23rd and 37th Virginia), while the other regiments of the Stonewall Brigade stayed in the woods to await orders.

The Union artillery, primarily ten-pound Parrott Rifles, unleashed a fusillade against the Virginia column marching toward them and inflicted approximately eighty casualties before Fulkerson and Garnett changed their course and headed west across the Middle Road and onto the eastern base of Sandy Ridge—a dominant ridge line one mile west of Pritchard’s Hill—where they subsequently hid in a locust grove. At the same time, between 2:00-2:30 p.m., Jackson feigned with Ashby’s cavalry upon the left flank of the Union infantry east of the Valley Pike, while he personally escorted fifteen cannon across marshy ground to the southwestern base of Sandy Ridge. From there, Jackson advanced to the military crest of the hill, deployed the artillery and supported it with two regiments of infantry. Shortly past 3 p.m., Jackson’s artillery opened fire and quickly suppressed the Union cannon on Pritchard’s Hill.

Jackson could do little else until his infantry concentrated, for they were strung out over four miles: two regiments on the hill, three more down the slope on the eastern base, two others in the woods with a battalion on the low ground, and the remaining two in reserve on the Valley Pike. Ashby had already split his force, sending 140 cavalrymen to the western side of Sandy Ridge and out of view. Colonel Kimball’s force was more concentrated, but locked in place on Pritchard’s Hill west of the Valley Pike and on the level ground east of that road. Col. Erastus B. Tyler’s Third Brigade, 2,300 strong, joined Kimball’s two active brigades. Kimball’s available infantry, 6,300 officers and men, was much reduced from the nearly 10,000 available foot soldiers reported six days earlier due to rampant illness and detachments guarding Federal-occupied towns in the northern Valley. Kimball sent Tyler’s entire brigade, more than one-third of his available force, on a mission to scale the northern wooded base of Sandy Ridge and capture Jackson’s artillery from behind.

Happenstance thwarted the mission at 4 p.m. when Tyler’s marching column clashed with the 27th Virginia infantry, 200 rank and file soldiers ordered by Jackson from their artillery supports to capture Union cannon. This skirmish broadened in the next half hour to a full-scale infantry fight as Tyler’s men worked themselves out of their precarious marching column and more and more Confederate infantry regiments reached the 27th Virginia—anchored behind a shoulder-high stone wall that ran east to west for 400 yards across the northern third of the ridge. Tyler’s best opportunity for success was thwarted when the 1st Virginia (U.S.) lost a race for the stone wall to Fulkerson’s two regiments who beat them to this fence and wrecked the Union regiment with a blistering volley from sixty yards.

By 4:45 p.m. Garnett controlled the Sandy Ridge infantry line with 1,800 soldiers lined three deep behind the wall. Those numbers matched Tyler’s attacking force below it, a brigade reduced in strength by casualties and cowardice. Kimball stripped away his Pritchard’s Hill protection by ordering another thirty-four companies of infantry available from five First and Second Brigade regiments to descend from Pritchard’s Hill and storm Sandy Ridge from the east. Although these 1,600 fresh soldiers still failed to provide the numerical strength necessary to dislodge an ensconced defense on high ground with artillery support, the Union regiments unintentionally reached the height as if ordered en echelon, bending Garnett’s thinned right flank southward as Union infantry attacked Confederate artillery directly for the first time in the battle.

The Confederates ran low on their ammunition with no reserve supply at hand. Union troops continued to apply overwhelming pressure on the right and rear of Garnett’s line. Near sunset at 6 p.m., Garnett called for his men to retreat, just as the 14th Indiana Infantry followed by the 13th Indiana, swarmed over a second wall near Confederate artillery, capturing two cannon and threatening the retreat route. Over the next hour Union cavalry and infantry chased down fleeing Confederates, their momentum stalled by two Confederate regiments protected by a third stone wall on Sandy Ridge.

The Battle of Kernstown ended ten hours after it began. Stonewall Jackson lost his first and only battle as an independent commander, twenty-two percent of his command—733 officers and men killed, wounded and captured. Kimball took 575 casualties in his victory. The Confederates received an unexpected and unplanned benefit within days of the battle when the U.S. War Department overreacted to Jackson’s presence in the lower Valley and reassigned 20,000 troops that had originally been earmarked to join McClellan on the Peninsula. Most of these men were sent into the Shenandoah Valley, sparking a springtime string of battles and Confederate victories in one of the most famous campaigns in modern military history.

About the Author:

Gary Ecelbarger is a charter member of the Kernstown Battlefield Association. He authored “We are in for it!”: The First Battle of Kernstown, March 23, 1862, and co-wrote Shenandoah 1862 for Time Life Books’ Voices of the Civil War. His new book on the 1862 Shenandoah Campaign, Shenandoah Shockwaves, will be published by the University of Oklahoma Press.

At the beginning of 1862, President Abraham Lincoln wanted his generals to attack in force against the Confederacy. [5] McClellan was massing his army for his Peninsula Campaign with the goal of capturing the Confederate capital of Richmond and ending the war. To do this McClellan had to weaken his forces protecting Washington, D.C.. [5] This left only two Union forces to protect Washington. Besides Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, General Irwin McDowell had forces in Northern Virginia. [5] Banks was to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Confederate forces then move up towards Washington so McDowell's force of 30,000 to move against Richmond from the north. [6] Banks left General James Shields with a force of about 9,000 in the Valley while he would move east to Manassas, Virginia, to be closer to Washington, D.C. [6]

Stonewall Jackson was given the task of keeping the Federal Army busy in the Valley so they could not join McClellan. [7] Jackson's cavalry commander, Colonel Turner Ashby, learned that part of the Union forces were leaving the valley and only a small force remained. [b] [7]

Jackson gave Ashby permission to attack while he moved the remainder of his forces up to join Ashby. [7] Unfortunately, Ashley's information was bad. While the Confederates thought they were attacking only four regiments (totalling about 3,000 men), there were actually about three times that number of Union soldiers. [10] The remaining Union troops remained out of sight during the skirmish. [10] General Shields was wounded in the fighting and turned command of the Union division over to Colonel Nathan Kimball. [3]

At about nine o'clock on the morning of March 23, Ashby's cavalry attacked. Kimball was not certain if this was another skirmish or the start of a battle. But just in case, he placed his forces in a strong defensive position on Pritchard Hill. [3] He placed his artillery there as well. On seeing this, Jackson concentrated his artillery on Sandy Ridge, west of Prichard Hill. [3] At about three-thirty, Jackson could see from Sandy Ridge that what he thought was a small Union force was actually much bigger. [3] Jackson told one of his officers "We are in for it." [3]

Kimball, believing he was up against a much larger Confederate force, decided to silence the Confederate guns on Sandy Ridge. [3] His attack was met with strong resistance from the Confederates and the battle soon became a stalemate. [3] Jackson kept sending in more Confederate troops, but he could not drive the Union line back. [3] Kimball still had fresh reserves he could send into the battle. By six o'clock the Confederates were running low on ammunition and were nearly exhausted. When one of his brigades ran out of ammunition completely, they had to withdraw from the battle. [10] The Union army attacked through the gap they left and Jackson's entire force had to quickly retreat. [10]

First Battle of Kernstown, 23 March1862 - History

Sunday morning, March 23, 1862, was sunny and warm in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley. Confederate general Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, a devout Christian, did not like to fight on the Lord’s Day. “The enemy could be destroyed tomorrow,” he reasoned. “The peace of the Lord would not be violated.” Still, the sun and warmth were a welcome relief for Jackson and his vaunted “foot cavalry,” who for several days had been braving high winds, cold temperatures, and hard rain in endurance-draining marches northward through the Shenandoah Valley. Some days they covered as many as 21 miles.

The destination of their exhausting marches was Winchester, Virginia, where soldiers from the Union Army of the Potomac’s V Corps were located, but Jackson and his men did not make it there. Instead, Jackson halted his men at Kernstown, a few miles south of Winchester. He wanted to rest his men, continue the march the next morning, and engage the enemy on Monday instead of Sunday. Unfortunately for Jackson, things did not work out quite the way he planned.

“Jackson’s Gone! Jackson’s Gone!”

During the previous few weeks, tensions had been high between Union and Confederate soldiers stationed in the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson’s forces, which previously had been camped in Winchester, had been forced to move around a great deal. Union Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks had been following orders from Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, to disrupt and remove Jackson’s forces and secure the Shenandoah Valley for the North. When Banks and the men of V Corps approached Winchester in early March, Jackson had intended to fight to maintain his position there. After all, this was familiar ground for Jackson, and he felt confident that he could be successful there.

Unfortunately for Jackson and his men, badly needed supply wagons with rations and muskets for the soldiers had been taken to the wrong location in Newtown, roughly eight miles south of Winchester, just as Banks’s V Corps was closing in on the town. The grim news and poor timing forced Jackson to make a difficult decision. With the arrival of Banks’s men, without supplies and rations, and seriously outnumbered, Jackson felt that he had to withdraw from Winchester without a fight. He was distraught at the decision, telling a local clergyman: “This I grieve to do. I must fight,” he said, drawing his sword halfway out of its scabbard for emphasis. But he surrendered to the inevitable. “No, it will cost the lives of too many brave men,” he said. “I must retreat. Nothing but necessity and the conviction that it will be for the best induces me to leave.” Under cover of darkness, Jackson and his men began their retreat from Winchester. A small boy accompanied them part of the way, crying out: “Jackson’s gone! Jackson’s gone!”

A member of the Pennsylvania Light Artillery stands watch over the battery, two weeks before Kernstown. Sketch by Alfred Waud.

Jackson marched from Winchester to Strasburg, 18 miles away. There, the men set up camp for several days and were able to resupply themselves with a limited amount of essential items. Unfortunately for them, the equipment was poor and the men remained fatigued. At any rate, their stay in Strasburg was short. While Jackson was deciding on his next move, Banks was ordered to detach a division of 9,500 men under the command of Brig. Gen. James Shields to pursue Jackson southward through the valley. As Shields and his men closed in, Jackson recognized the same type of threat he had faced at Winchester and came to the same conclusion. On March 15, Jackson and his men left Strasburg and continued to search for a more strategically situated piece of ground.

Jackson found a new location at Rude’s Hill, three miles south of Mt. Jackson. Rude’s Hill was an excellent defensive location, and it was there that he established camp. On March 19, he set up his headquarters near the settlement of Hawkinstown, three miles north of Mt. Jackson. Utilizing the geography allowed Jackson to assess the situation in the valley, which provided him with an opportunity to figure out what to do next. At Rude’s Hill, he began to get word of a larger plan that was unfolding regarding the movements of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was poised for a major assault on the Confederate capital of Richmond.

Jackson’s Decision to Intercept Banks

McClellan’s plan was a sound one. Using the United States Navy in tandem with the Army, McClellan wanted to land on the Virginia Peninsula and march west toward Richmond, with the Navy providing protection of the Army’s flanks along the York and James Rivers. If his plan was successful, McClellan would be hailed as the savior of the Union. “The moment for action has arrived, and I know that I can trust in you to save our country,” McClellan informed his men.

McClellan felt that Banks and his men had done an excellent job of dislodging the Confederates from the Shenandoah, specifically from the Winchester and the Manassas Gap Railroad areas. Believing that these areas were secure, McClellan instructed Banks to begin moving eastward across the Blue Ridge Mountains to join forces for an all-out assault on Richmond. McClellan ordered Banks to leave several regiments behind to guard the railroad bridge and to provide protection to V Corps. Banks ordered Shields to remain in the valley with several divisions.

Turner Ashby.

According to reports from Jackson’s cavalry chief, Colonel Turner Ashby, Banks’s entire army was leaving the Valley to join forces with McClellan on the Virginia Peninsula. On Saturday evening, March 22, Ashby and his men began to skirmish with Union forces in the Winchester and Kernstown areas in an attempt to disrupt the movements of V Corps. After receiving the report from Ashby, Jackson felt that together they could attack the reduced Union forces stationed around Winchester and possibly disrupt Banks’s march toward McClellan on the peninsula. Unfortunately for Jackson, Ashby’s information was incorrect. What Ashby reported as a limited Union force was actually a full division of 9,500 men, intent on securing the Shenandoah and providing cover for Banks’s men.

If Banks was successful in linking up with McClellan, they might launch an assault on Richmond that could end the war. Jackson felt that his only options were to either intercept Banks before he could join forces with McClellan or else cause a major disruption in the Shenandoah Valley that would pull forces away from McClellan, threaten Washington, and stall the campaign on the Virginia Peninsula. For Jackson, it was time to march back to Winchester and fight.

“I Determined to Advance at Once”

Early in the morning of March 23, Jackson and his men began their march toward the Winchester area. Covering roughly 15 miles through the valley, Jackson halted the advance around 2 pm, one mile outside of Kernstown and three miles south of Winchester. He ordered his men to set up tents. All the regiments except for Colonel John A. Campbell’s 48th Virginia, which was the rear guard, arrived within a mile or two of Kernstown that afternoon. Jackson originally had no intention of engaging the enemy on the 23rd, but additional information presented to him during the morning march caused him to reconsider. Ashby passed along word from usually reliable Winchester sources that the Federals had only four regiments left inside the town and that even those forces were planning to withdraw shortly to Harpers Ferry.

Even so, Jackson felt that attacking the enemy immediately was not the most prudent decision early Monday morning would be better. But when Jackson and his men arrived outside Kernstown, he noticed that their positions were visible to the Union soldiers on the opposite heights and therefore they were already compromised and vulnerable. “I concluded that it would be dangerous to postpone it until the next day, as re-enforcements might be brought up during the night,” Jackson reported afterward. “I determined to advance at once.”

The Union side of the battle would not, in fact, be commanded by Shields. The day before, Shields had been severely wounded in a skirmish with Ashby’s men when an artillery shell exploded nearby and a fragment struck Shields in the upper arm, breaking the bone. The wound was severe enough to cause Shields to leave the field. Senior regimental officer Colonel Nathan Kimball, an Indiana physician, took command of the division. Kimball, like Shields, was an experienced Mexican War veteran, a hero of the Battle of Buena Vista, but he would be the third divisional commander in three weeks. (The original commander, Brig. Gen. Frederick Lander, had died of illness on March 2.) It was unclear whether he could handle his men competently.

Union Brigadier General James Shields is wounded by an exploding shell during skirmishing one day before Kernstown. Currier & Ives, 1862.

Early in the morning of the 23rd, Ashby’s forces renewed the attack, advancing from Kernstown and occupying a position with their artillery batteries on the heights to the right of the Valley Turnpike leading into Winchester. Ashby attempted to turn the Union flank, but Kimball proved up to the task of command, directing the 8th and 67th Ohio Regiments to meet the Confederates head-on. His men held strong, driving the Southern forces back through Kernstown and uncovering the only high ground in the area, a small knoll called Pritchard’s Hill. Immediately realizing the hill’s importance, Kimball stationed the 1st Brigade and two batteries of artillery on the crest and moved another brigade to the left of the hill. A third brigade was held in reserve in the rear, out of sight of the approaching Southerners.

Confusion at Pritchard’s Hill

Jackson arrived at Kernstown in mid-afternoon and conferred with Ashby, who continued to assure him that only a small Union force held Pritchard’s Hill. Breaking one of his own rules, Jackson did not personally reconnoiter the field but accepted Ashby’s report at face value. It was a crucial mistake. Around 4 pm, Jackson unleashed an attack on the Union left, whose commanding feature, the six-mile-long Sandy Ridge, was covered by dense forest and fronted by a shallow stream, Hogg Run. Jackson sent some of Ashby’s men forward to skirmish along the stream while the rest of the cavalry and Jackson’s three infantry brigades wheeled left and headed for the woods flanking Pritchard’s Hill.

The Confederate attack began to unravel from the start. Jackson’s lead brigade, commanded by Colonel Samuel V. Fulkerson, ran into heavy Union artillery fire and took shelter—ironically—behind a stone wall. There, Jackson reported, his men “opened a destructive fire which drove back the Northern forces in great disorder after sustaining a heavy loss, and leaving the colors of one of their regiments upon the field.” It should have been enough to drive away a Union brigade. The only problem was that there were three Union brigades in the vicinity, and one of them, commanded by Ohio-born Colonel Erastus B. Tyler, moved up to support their embattled comrades.

Pritchard’s Hill, center, held a commanding view of the battlefield. From there Union forces were able to mount a successful flank attack.

In the meantime, confusion reigned on the Confederate side. Jackson’s second in command, Brig. Gen. Richard Garnett, was commanding the famed Stonewall Brigade, which was supposed to be kept in reserve while Fulkerson cleared out the supposedly small enemy force. Jackson had not bothered to brief Garnett on his overall battle plan, perhaps expecting to make short work of the Federals, and Garnett accordingly was holding to a slower pace in the rear of the assault. Frustrated by what he considered the tardy progress of his namesake brigade, Jackson ordered one of the regiments to hurry to Fulkerson’s support. While Garnett went to make the dispositions, Jackson abruptly ordered the entire brigade forward.

Subordinate officers, unsure of whether to obey Jackson or Garnett, dawdled. Men wandered about desultorily while their officers sent back aides to clarify their instructions. During the interval, Jackson thought that his men were actually breaking through the Union lines and carrying the field. Suddenly, a massive explosion occurred to Jackson’s left, and Federal artillery came pounding into the center and left of Jackson’s lines. Jackson knew that he was in trouble. Attempting to assess the trouble, he sent a member of his staff, Sandie Pendleton, to find out where the extra Union artillery was coming from. Pendleton reported back to Jackson that the enemy did not have four regiments on hand, but at least three times that number. Jackson responded, “Say nothing about it, but we are in for it.”

Nathan Kimball.

Kimball described the surprise artillery attack from the Union point of view: “At this juncture I ordered the Third Brigade, Colonel E.B. Tyler, Seventh Ohio, commanding, composed of the Seventh and Twenty-ninth Ohio, First Virginia, Seventh Indiana, and One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania, to move to the right to gain the flank of the enemy, and charge them through the wood to their batteries posted on the hill. They moved forward steadily and gallantly, opening a galling fire on the enemy’s infantry. The right wing of the Eighth Ohio, the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Indiana Regiments, Sixty-seventh Ohio, Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, and Fifth Ohio, were sent forward to support Tyler’s brigade, each one in its turn moving gallantly forward, sustaining a heavy fire from both the enemy’s batteries and musketry. Soon all of the regiments above named were pouring forth a well-directed fire, which was promptly answered by the enemy, and after a hotly contested action of two hours, just as night closed in, the enemy gave way and were soon completely routed, leaving their dead and wounded on the field, together with two pieces of artillery and four caissons.”

“Beat the Rally!”

In the center of the storm, the men of the Stonewall Brigade found themselves literally engaged in the fight of their lives. Taking positions to the right of Fulkerson’s men at the stone wall, Garnett’s brigade helped turn back repeated Union attacks—only to run out of ammunition as the afternoon waned. Confederates began drifting rearward in a growing stream. Jackson, furious, stopped one soldier and demanded to know why he was falling back. When the soldier replied that he had run out of ammunition, the general shouted, “Then go back and give them the bayonet!” Garnett, closer to the action at the front, gave the order to fall back. “Had I not done so,” he said later, “we would have run imminent risk of being routed by superiority of numbers, which would have resulted probably in the loss of part of our artillery and also endangered our transportation.” At 6:30 pm, he ordered the brigade to withdraw. Fulkerson’s men soon followed suit.

Combat artist Alfred Waud’s eyewitness sketch of the Union attack on the stone wall at Kernstown was published three weeks later in Harper’s Weekly.

Jackson angrily made his way to the front, where he encountered Garnett shouting at his men to make an orderly retreat. “Why have you not rallied your men?” Jackson demanded. “Halt and rally!” Garnett tried to explain the situation, but Jackson turned away and grabbed a frightened drummer boy by the shoulder. “Beat the rally!” he screamed. “Beat the rally!”

Jackson surveyed the field and felt that it was not time yet to fall back into safer positions. “Though our troops were fighting under great disadvantages,” he said later, “I regret that General Garnett should have given the order to fall back, as otherwise the enemy’s advance would at least have been retarded, and the remaining part of my infantry reserve have had a better opportunity for coming up and taking part in the engagement if the enemy continued to press forward.”

Garnett finally located Colonel William Harman of the 5th Virginia and directed him to place the regiment in a defensive position on the crest of a small hill while the rest of the Confederates withdrew. Thanks in large part to the disarray of the on-charging Union troops and the approaching darkness, Harman’s men, joined by elements of the 42nd Virginia, managed to stabilize the line. As night fell, the infantry fell back behind the screening cavalry and headed south along the Valley Turnpike toward Bartonsville.

The Faulty Intelligence of Colonel Ashby

By 8 pm, the Battle of Kernstown was over. Of the 12,300 men engaged in the struggle, 1,308 were casualties. On the Union side there were 590 casualties, while the Confederates suffered 718 losses, including 263 captured. Among the latter was one of Jackson’s own kinsmen: Lieutenant George G. Junkin, a cousin of the general’s first wife, Ellie. Jackson, dismounting beside a campfire alongside the road, stood looking morosely into the flames. A Southern cavalryman, with ill-advised humor, remarked to the general that “the Yankees don’t seem willing to quit Winchester, sir. It was reported that they were retreating, but I guess they’re retreating after us.” Jackson’s eyes flashed. “I think I may say I am satisfied, sir,” he snapped.

In the cold light of day, Jackson would find himself a good deal less satisfied.

Another northern artist, Edwin Forbes, made this vivid drawing of ragtag Confederate prisoners after Kernstown. A total of 263 Confederates were captured at the battle.

Clearly, Ashby’s faulty report on the enemy strength at Winchester was a major contributing factor in the defeat. Jackson’s major mistake in sending in his reserves during the midpoint of the battle was based in large part on Ashby’s badly underestimated numbers. For his part, Ashby admitted his erroneous intelligence in his official report. “Having followed the enemy in his hasty retreat from Strasburg on Saturday evening,” he wrote, “I came upon the forces remaining in Winchester within a mile of that place and became satisfied that he had but four regiments, and learned that they had orders to march in the direction of Harpers Ferry.”

Although the bad information may have caused Jackson’s defeat, he was initially magnanimous, praising Ashby in his official report of the battle: “During the engagement Colonel Ashby, with a portion of his command, including Chew’s battery, which rendered valuable service, remained on our right, and not only protected our rear in the vicinity of the Valley turnpike, but also served to threaten the enemy’s front and left. Colonel Ashby fully sustained his deservedly high reputation by the able manner in which he discharged the important trust confided to him.” Jackson also praised the ladies of Winchester, who tended to the injured and sick, and the men of Winchester who buried the dead.

General Garnett’s Court Martial

Richard Garnett.

The general was not so accommodating to Garnett. Two weeks after the battle, Jackson relieved Garnett of command and placed him under arrest pending a court-martial for his unauthorized retreat at Kernstown. “I regard Gen. Garnett as so incompetent a brigade commander,” Jackson wrote, “that, instead of building up a brigade, a good one, if turned over to him, would actually deteriorate under his command.”

Garnett, furious and embarrassed, demanded an immediate trial. The five regimental colonels in the Stonewall Brigade rallied to his defense, saying Garnett’s actions had been justified. Jackson’s loyal aide, Sandie Pendleton, noted in a letter home to his mother that “the brigade is in a very loud humor at [Garnett’s arrest] for he was a pleasant man and exceedingly popular.” But Pendleton defended Jackson’s decision, adding, “The arrest, however, was necessary, and I now see why Napoleon considered a blunder worse than a fault. Genl. G’s fault was a blunder.”

In the end, the court-martial was delayed, then adjourned without a verdict. Garnett returned to the army as a brigadier in Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s I Corps and was later killed commanding his brigade during Pickett’s Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg. Too sick to walk that day, Garnett had ridden a horse directly up to the Union lines before being fatally wounded. Many felt that his actions at Gettysburg were a pointed attempt to regain the reputation he had lost at Kernstown.

A Strategic Victory for Stonewall Jackson

Kernstown remained Stonewall Jackson’s only major tactical defeat during the war. But while the Union succeeded in forcing Jackson’s men off the field and into retreat the following day, Jackson in the end accomplished most of his original objectives, albeit inadvertently. Abraham Lincoln, upon learning of the surprising battle in the Shenandoah, became overly concerned about the potential threat to Washington. He ordered two full divisions from Banks’s corps back into the valley and recalled Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell’s I Corps to Washington as well, drawing at least 50,000 valuable men away from McClellan’s upcoming Peninsula Campaign. The absence of these men may well have been a determining factor in McClellan’s eventual defeat. In this way, at least, Kernstown could be considered a strategic victory for Jackson and the Confederates, despite the fact they had been driven from the field.

That was the position Jackson took as well. In an after-action report filed during the second week of April, he maintained: “Though Winchester was not recovered, yet the more important object, for the present, that of calling back troops that were leaving the valley, and thus preventing a junction of Banks’ command with other forces was accomplished, in addition to his heavy loss in killed and wounded.” A few days later, Jackson wrote to his wife, Anna: “I am well satisfied with the result. Time has shown that while the field is in possession of the enemy, the most essential fruits of the battle are ours. For this and all our Heavenly Father’s blessings, I wish I could be ten thousand times more thankful.”

Jackson spent the remaining months of spring engaged in his Valley Campaign constantly disrupting Union forces and preventing them from reinforcing McClellan. The Battles of McDowell, Front Royal, First Winchester, Cross Keys, and Port Republic were all victories for Jackson. By the time the Battle of Port Republic was over in early June 1862, Jackson was able to join General Robert E. Lee for the Seven Days’ Battles, where Lee successfully defeated McClellan and forced him to retreat back to the Virginia Peninsula, thus ending the Peninsula Campaign. As one modern historian has noted: “Had Jackson won the Battle of Kernstown, he could scarcely have achieved a more favorable result. History can provide few examples of a defeat that so favored the defeated. Jackson’s lucky star had begun its ascendancy.”

The 7th OVI at The Battle of Kernstown&mdashMarch, 1862

As 1862 began, President Lincoln urged his Generals to advance against the forces of the Confederacy in all theaters. The offensive that utilized most of the Union Army&rsquos men and resources was General George B. McClellan&rsquos Peninsula Campaign. McClellan&rsquos goal was to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond. To accomplish this, his plan required massive coordination amongst different commands spread across the state of Virginia. One of these commands was headed by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, far from the capital of the Confederacy. Banks&rsquo assignment was to guard against any Confederate intrusions up the valley which could threaten Washington DC. With the bulk of McClellan&rsquos forces converging on Richmond, the defenses of the capitol were significantly weakened. Only the commands of General Banks in the valley and General Irwin McDowell&rsquos forces in Northern Virginia stood between the capital and any threatening Confederate armies.

Jackson's Valley Campaign (Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com)

Simultaneous to Banks&rsquo efforts, Confederate General Thomas &ldquoStonewall&rdquo Jackson was ordered to occupy the attention of Union soldiers in the valley. The Confederate high command wanted to tie up as many Union soldiers, as far away from Richmond, as possible. Doing this would allow them to face a much weakened army commanded an overly cautious General McClellan near Richmond. On March 22nd, 1862, Jackson&rsquos cavalry and infantry skirmished with Union troops of Brigadier General James Shields, a subordinate of Banks, between the towns of Kernstown and Winchester. The attack occurred as Banks was leaving the valley with one of his two divisions. Previously, Banks had been satisfied that Jackson was of no great threat in the northern region of the Shenandoah Valley. The defense of the Union position was left to Brigadier General Shields . Shields, however, was wounded during the fighting on March 22nd. As a result, he turned his command over to Col. Nathan Kimball. One of the regiments under Kimball was the 7th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Company C of the regiment was made up primarily of Oberlin men. They were now under immediate command of Lt. Col. William R. Creighton. Col. Erastus Tyler, the 7th OVI&rsquos former commander, had been promoted to lead a brigade.

The Battle of 1st Kernstown

The morning of March 23rd saw the resumption of the previous day&rsquos fight alongside the Valley Turnpike, about half way between Winchester (towards the north) and Kernstown (towards the south). A brigade of Union infantry fought off Stonewall Jacksons cavalry and slowly pushed them back towards Kernstown. In retreating, the Confederate forces left a prime eminence, Pritchard&rsquos Hill, unattended. As Col. Kimball recognized the hill&rsquos importance, he quickly placed another brigade of infantry and batteries under Lt. Col. Phillip Daum atop it. The view from Pritchard&rsquos Hill commanded the entire battlefield. With such a commanding view of the battlefield, Kimball was determined to hold his ground and let the Confederates attack him. He quickly ordered Col. Tyler to bring up his brigade as a reserve. 1

Around noon of March 23rd, 1862 the 7th Ohio, at the front of Tyler&rsquos brigade, marched through the streets of Winchester. It was only a couple of days before that the 7th Ohio had come through here, the regimental band striking up &ldquoJohn Brown&rsquos Body&rdquo. Desolation had greeted the regiment when they marched through as conquerors, as Winchester&rsquos population held southern sympathies. But now the same streets, as well as rooftops and trees, were filled with citizens looking towards Kernstown and the booming cannons a few miles to the south. 2 The 7th OVI marched through the toll gate, down the Valley Turnpike and arrived behind Pritchard&rsquos Hill. They were halted and assigned to guard the batteries of Lt. Col Philip Daum, which were locked in an artillery duel with Confederate batteries placed Sandy Ridge.

Once the 7th reached their position to support the batteries, they engaged in what Corporal Selden A. Day of Co. C said was &ldquothe most trying of all that day&rsquos hard work&rdquo. 3 For nearly three hours, the regiment endured a nerve-wracking artillery bombardment from which they could not run. The occasional Confederate artillery round would overshoot its target of Union infantry and artillery on Pritchard&rsquos Hill and end up hitting the 7th OVI. The men held, and at the front of them rode Colonel Tyler who stayed calm and cool atop his mount.

The 7th Ohio Enters the Battle

Around 4pm Colonel Tyler&rsquos division commander, Colonel Nathan Kimball, gave him the order to advance his brigade to the right of the Union position onto a rise called Sandy Ridge. Just beyond the ridge, a Confederate battery was hammering away at the Union position on Pritchard Hill. Kimball wanted Tyler&rsquos Brigade to attack the distant Confederate battery. 4 Almost simultaneously, Stonewall Jackson was endeavoring to push on the Union&rsquos right flank. He intended to use Brigadier General Richard Garnett&rsquos brigade to seize the heights, push the Union batteries off of Pritchard Hill and capture the Valley Pike leading the way to Winchester. 5

Before beginning his advance, Colonel Tyler announced to his men, &ldquoBoys, put on your bayonets&hellipyou will need them&rdquo. 6 The brigade turned to the right and was immediately formed into columns by division, a formation in which &ldquothe brigade showed a front of just two companies, perhaps seventy-five yards across, with the remaining forty-eight companies aligned like dominos in twenty-four lines to a depth of four hundred yards&rdquo. 7 Tyler&rsquos brigade swung off the Valley Pike and into the fields and woods south of Kernstown. After marching in this direction, Tyler turned his brigade left where they entered the woods on Sandy Ridge.

Though he deployed skirmishers in front of his column, an historian of the battle, Peter Cozzens said that Tyler&rsquos decision to keep his men in column was a terrible error. Cozzens acknowledged Tyler&rsquos need to maintain &ldquotactical control&rdquo of his men while in the broken and wooded ground of Sandy Ridge, but it was a formation that left the brigade vulnerable and unable to respond to an attack. 8 While skirmishers were sent out the brigade waited. George L. Wood of the 7th Ohio noted the men did so &ldquobreathless, and with anxious hearts&rdquo. 9 All was silent in the woods until just about an hour after the brigade began its march, when Tyler&rsquos skirmishers met the enemy. Skirmishers of the 27th Virginia were posted along the edge of the woods on Sandy Ridge. They opened fire from behind trees doing damage to Tyler&rsquos front lines, who urged his brigade forward still in column formation. 10

As the brigade moved out of the woods, it followed a gentle descent towards a ravine. Beyond the ravine and above the men of Tyler&rsquos lead companies was a hill atop sat a stone wall. Behind the stone wall were two full regiments of rebel infantry. Tyler was heard to order &ldquoCharge, bayonets!&rdquo and the brigade broke into a run down the slope. 11 Some of the men in the 7th Ohio yelled out &ldquoCross Lanes!&rdquo as they charged, naming their first battle (an embarrassing rout) as a means to exercise their demons and to spur them on. 12 Immediately, the Confederates opened up with a storm of rifles and artillery. Orderly Sergeant Danforth of the 7th Ohio was shot and died instantly. The Confederate volley was the worst Tyler and the men in his brigade had ever seen. Tyler noted that the fire was so galling and came on &ldquowith such force that I immediately ordered up my reserve&rdquo. 13 Captain George L. Wood remembered:

the grape and canister was tearing bark from the tree over our heads, while the solid shot and shell made great gaps in their trunks. Under our feet the turf was being torn up, and around and about us the air was thick with flying missiles. Not a gun was fired on our side. The head of the column soon reached the ravine, when a deafening discharge of musketry greeted us. A sheet of flame shot along the stone wall, followed by an explosion that shook the earth, and the missiles tore through the solid ranks of the command with a fearful certainty. 14

By the time the lead companies of the 7th Ohio reached the ravine, mass confusion reigned. The violence of the Confederate barrage was enough to bewilder even the most veteran unit. Here Tyler&rsquos decision to keep his men in column by division began to have its more adverse effect as commands on the company and regimental levels intermingled. Men hid in depressions and behind what scant trees they could find. Of the break down in command, Peter Cozzens wrote, &ldquofrom behind what cover they could find, the Federals returned the fire, each man an army of one.&rdquo 15

Tyler's Brigade in the ravine between Sandy Ridge and the stone wall (Library of Congress)

Officers, instead of directing fire, fought alongside enlisted men. Lt. Col. Creighton of the 7th Ohio had his horse shot from underneath him. Creighton was seen to leap from the wounded and frightened animal, grab a rifle off a wounded soldier and shoot up towards the stone wall. Colonel Tyler and Major Casement partook in the engagement as well, the latter earning a number of bullet holes through his clothing. 16 More and more men were getting hit, and not just from Confederate guns. Soldiers from other Union regiments were arrayed across the hill behind the ravine and firing off shots, sometimes into the backs of the men of the 7th Ohio. Corporal Selden Day remembered, &ldquoMen were falling all around me, and glancing backward I saw that the slope of the hill was barely sufficient to enable the men in the rear to fire safely over the heads of those of us in the front. A sergeant of Company H fell near me, shot through the neck, and I was quite sure it was done from the rear&rdquo. Day himself was shot, and sustained a bruise on his right hand. 17 The Confederate fire continued to rake the men in the ravine and the hillside. The 110th Pennsylvania was thrown into such confusion by the attack that they withdrew up the face of the Sandy Ridge and were of little use the rest of the afternoon. 18

While some companies attempted an advance up towards the stone wall, Colonel Tyler attempted to regain the tactical edge with a flank march to the left. In all, some one hundred assorted men from Companies C, D and F of the 7th Ohio attempted this maneuver towards a hillock some distance to the left. Had the bulk of the regiment responded to the order, they may have been able to turn the rebel line. As it was, the din and adrenaline of battle reduced the maneuver considerably. Private F.M. Palmer of Company C was one a few men shot while climbing a wooden fence near the hillock on the left. He survived with a wound through the neck for two weeks until he died. Corporal Day of the Company C also heard the order to deploy left. He dutifully ran towards the wooden fence as had others. However, he soon noticed only a few other men had followed the order. 19 Col. Tyler&rsquos attempt at a flank attack fell apart quickly. With no support and with such few numbers to attack the flankers they found their way back to the relative safety of the ravine. 20

Less than a half hour had passed from when the fighting began to when Confederate reinforcements began to arrive at the stone wall. Entrenched behind a stone wall looking down at their confused and mostly exposed adversaries, the Confederates of Garnett&rsquos brigade began to gain the initiative as their own numbers swelled. 21 Seeing this, Tyler again tried to gain the tactical advantage, this time by extending his line to the right. He ordered another of his regiments, the 1st [West]Virginia to make an attack on the far left of the Confederate line. This movement coincided with the Confederates bolstering their defenses on that part of their line. As the 1st [West] Virginia moved into an open field, it met a terrible fire and was forced back to the ravine. 22

The Battle of First Kernstown, showing Tyler's assault (Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com)

Tyler&rsquos command continued to get bludgeoned by Garnett&rsquos brigade, now reinforced by other Virginia Regiments. Captain George Wood wrote, &ldquoThe roar of musketry was now deafening. The dying and the dead were lying thick upon the hillside, but neither army seemed to waver. The confusion attending the getting of troops into action had ceased. The great &lsquodance of death&rsquo seemed to be going forward without a motion. The only evidence of life on that gory field, was the vomiting forth of flame and smoke from thousands of well-aimed muskets.&rdquo 23 Corporal Day, meanwhile, had managed to escape the violence of the ravine and crawled up to a small notch on the hill. He found himself looking over the brow of the hill and along the line, full of the Virginians of Garnett&rsquos brigade, at the stone wall. There is no telling how many Confederate soldiers Corporal Day was able to hit, but he effectively acted as a sharpshooter. He advanced along the hill cautiously along his stomach, and hands and knees, always maintaining cover until the time came to fire. He emptied his cartridge box once, and went down the hill towards the ravine. There he found more ammunition on the body of a dead compatriot and crawled back towards the top of the hill. 24

Cpl. Day wasn&rsquot alone on the hill, nor was he without danger. He noted a number of bullets striking the ground dangerously close to him. Prior to emptying his ammunition, he was joined by man from another company of the 7th Ohio he didn&rsquot know. He and the mystery soldier shot round after round into the Confederate line. At one point Cpl. Day looked to the man who only said to him &ldquoIsn&rsquot it fun?&rdquo Day did not respond. When Day looked back at the man a few moments later, he had been shot dead. 25

The day grew late. There was perhaps an hour of daylight left. Both Col. Nathan Kimball and Stonewall Jackson knew if their respective commands could hold against the other until dark, they could claim victory. In attempting to force the Confederates from the stonewall on Sandy Ridge, Col. Kimball decided to strip his artillery on Pritchard Hill of infantry and send the of brigade of the 8th and 67th Ohio, 14th Indiana and 84th Pennsylvania to assist Tyler. Five companies of the 5th Ohio of Colonel Jeremiah Sullivan&rsquos brigade were also sent in. The regiments arrived on the Confederate right flank, a few hundred yards to the left of the 7th Ohio, piecemeal and without any real weight to the attack. They were met by 1st and 2nd Virginia and the Irish Battalion. The Federal regiments were repulsed, but only initially. The Confederates had been fighting for hours and were running low on ammunition. 26

Early evening found Corporal Day back in his rifle pit taking careful aim towards the 33rd Virginia. He had watched scores of his comrades make charges up the hill only to be turned back by rifle fire. As he watched a third charge take form, he could see the 21st Virginia, further down the line, begin to retreat from the stone wall. 27 Unbeknownst to the Federals, Confederate Brigadier General Garnett caught wind of a Federal Cavalry envelopment on his left and ordered a general retreat from the stone wall. The 21st Virginia was the first to receive the order. They were shortly followed by the 4th and 33rd Virginia. 28 The defenses at the stonewall began to slowly peel away.

Tyler's Brigade charges the Confederate line at the stone wall. (www.etc.usf.edu)

Cpl. Day could see numbers of men from his brigade reaching the stone wall and firing at the crouching and retreating Virginians. At this point he turned back to his comrades in the ravine and shouted &ldquoWe have got them started! Come on, come on!&rdquo He jumped over the wall and fired at a group of Confederates. As he reloaded he was joined by Privates James Dixon and Orlando H. Worcester, two of his companions. The three of them started after the Confederates. 29

The rest of the Confederate line began to retire. The regiments of Kimball&rsquos brigade began their pursuit of Garnett&rsquos men, as did elements of Tyler&rsquos brigade. Major John Casement of the 7th Ohio rode up the hill and crossed paths with Day, Dixon and Worcester. They rallied together and joined the pursuit of the Confederates, toward Tyler&rsquos original objective earlier that day: the Confederate artillery battery that threatened Sandy Ridge. The major, on horseback, beat Day to the grove which housed the artillery battery. By the time he got there, Day noticed Dixon and Worcester were nowhere to be seen. A few more men from Tyler&rsquos brigade passed through the wrecked battery and joined in the chase. Day spotted a cluster of Confederates and opened fire. As he drew near to the lone man who did not run off from his firing, he was horrified. He realized they had been carrying a wounded comrade off and that he had shot the wounded man again. Day said of this &ldquoI was completely overcome for the time, and the tears ran down my face.&rdquo 30

With twilight falling and the adrenaline drying up, much of Tyler&rsquos command stopped where it was, spread across Sandy Ridge. Men from Tyler&rsquos regiments took stock of the situation, men stood next to others of completely different units as they made their way back to the stone wall. The Battle of Kernstown was drawing to a close. 31

Cpl. Day had one more bit of excitement left in store for him. As he took survey of the fading light across the fields, he could see troops moving off to the left that he mistook to be Kimball&rsquos brigade trailing after the Confederates. Day called out to a lone staff officer to find out the location of the 7th Ohio. The staff officer turned out to be a member of Stonewall Jackson&rsquos staff, Lieutenant Junkin. Day was soon joined by two members of the 14th Indiana who assisted in the apprehension. The four men walked back to the Union lines where Day ran into Dixon who implored Day to come help him with their wounded comrade Worcester. Day turned his prisoner over to the Indiana men and went to help with Worcester. 32

Of the 590 Union casualties that day, 80 were in the 7th Ohio. Of that 80, 6 were wounded, only one of whom returned to duty. Sergeant Danforth was the only member of Company C to be killed outright. Four others: Privates Wallace Coburn, Frederick Palmer, Edward G. Sackett and Orlander H. Worcester, would die over the next few weeks. Even the colors of the 7th Ohio were in tatters: 28 balls struck the flag, while another tore apart the decorative crescent at the top of the staff, still another took a chunk out of the staff itself. 33 For his gallantry after being wounded, for being one of the first of his brigade over the stone wall, and for capturing a staff officer of the Confederate high command, Corporal Selden Day was promoted to Sergeant. 34

As the firing died down, Company C&rsquos Private Daniel of Judson of Oberlin, was back in Winchester. He had fallen ill a few days prior and had to spend the march to Winchester in an ambulance much to his dismay. He was not happy about having to miss the fight with his comrades and wrote in his journal as the skies went black: &ldquoNight comes and the sound ceases. I lie down to be awakened at midnight by Walworth who with a ball through his fore arm had made his way to camp. I do all I can to help him and then wait to hear the result. The day is ours, but at what cost?&rdquo 35

The Union division under Col. Kimball&rsquos tentative command had defeated Stonewall Jackson&rsquos forces. It would prove to be the only time Jackson tasted defeat during the war. Yet, Jackson&rsquos defeat was only a tactical one strategically he had accomplished his goal. Jackson&rsquos temerity frightened the Union high command, especially President Lincoln, into believing he had a much larger force than he actually did. The Shenandoah Valley was seen as an open back door to Washington DC for the Confederates. Lincoln ordered Union troops into the Shenandoah Valley and kept additional tens of thousands more Union soldiers close to Washington DC in case of Confederate attack. This had an adverse effect on General McClellan&rsquos efforts on the Virginia Peninsula. Because of Lincoln&rsquos redistribution of soldiers, McClellan was left without one-third of his entire 150,000 man force he needed to attack Richmond. McClellan&rsquos ensuing failure to conquer the Confederate capital, and the Confederate victory during the Seven Days&rsquo Battle in June of 1862, ensured the war would go on longer. 36

2 Lawrence Wilson, ed. Itinerary of the Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry 1861-1864 With Roster, Portraits and Biographies, (New York: Neale Publishing Company, 1907) 127, 129 and Major George L. Wood, The Seventh Regiment: A Record, (New York: James Miller, 1865) 98.

5 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson&rsquos Valley Campaign, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008) 166, 168 and Wilson 130.

12 Lorain County News, "The Seventh O.V. at the Battle of Winchester" April 2, 1862, pg.2

13 Wilson 130 (Tyler's report).

18 Cozzens 181 and Wood 101.

19 Wilder 26 and Wilson 136-137.

20 Cozzens 180 and Wood 101.

22 Cozzens 181-182 and Wood 102.

24 Wilson 137-138 (Selden Day).

30 Wilson 138-140 (Selden Day).

32 Wilson 141-143 (Selden Day).

33 Wilson 131 (Tyler's Report).

35 The Private Civil War Journal of Daniel S. Judson Co. C 7th Regt. Ohio , transcribed by Clare Ann Hatten, Oberlin Heritage Center, 23.

Talk:First Battle of Kernstown

The First Battle of Kernstown map reflects the presence of the 32nd Virginia Infantry Regiment (32 VA) behind the stone wall on Sandy Ridge. This appears to be a typographical error, as the 32nd Virginia was not present at the First battle of Kernstown (or any of the Valley Campaign of 1862, for that matter.) The correct designation for the unit shown on the map is the 33rd Virginia Infantry Regiment (33 VA), which was part of Garnett's First Infantry (Stonewall) Brigade, engaged at Kernstown, along with the 2nd, 4th, and 27th Virginia Infantry regiments. Note that all four of these regiments (should) appear on the map twice, denoting the shift of the battle action from Pritchard's Hill to Sandy Ridge during the afternoon. Fcfprivateer (talk) 23:40, 20 July 2014 (UTC)

I fixed it. Thanks for pointing this out. Hal Jespersen (talk) 16:39, 22 July 2014 (UTC)

Does anyone object to this reformat? I think the appearance is a bit more usable than the wikitable layout and it will allow the separate Order of Battle pages to be deleted. Hungrydog55 (talk) 19:52, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

1862 March 26: Battle of Kernstown

The First Battle of Kernstown, fought near Winchester, Virginia, was the opening battle of Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley campaign, and Jackson’s only defeat of the war. While technically a defeat for the South, it did prevent Union troops from moving from the Shenandoah Valley to reinforce McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign.

This article is from the March 26, 1862, issue of The Hudson North Star.

James Shields, from “Harper’s Pictorial History of the Civil War𔄣

A N O T H E R V I C T O R Y !

Union Loss One Hundred and Fifty.



Cavalry Pursuing the flying Enemy.

Rumor that New Orleans is Ours.

MILWAUKEE, March 24.—Gen. Shields 2 had a slight skirmish Saturday, in which he was slightly injured in the arm from a shell fragment. It appears from the following despatch that this was the beginning of a hard fought battle:

WINCHESTER, March 23.— We have achieved a complete victory over General Jackson 3 have taken two guns and caissons. About 100 rebels were killed, and twice as many wounded. Our loss is not over 150 killed and wounded. The enemy is in full retreat.

Another despatch says we have achieved a most glorious victory over the combined forces of Jackson, Smith and Langstreet [sic]. 4

The battle was fought within four miles of Winchester, from 10½ [10:30] this morning until dark.

The enemy numbered about 15,000 our forces not over 8,000.

The enemy’s loss was double that of our.

We captured a large numbers [sic] of prisoners.

The ground is covered with their muskets, cast away in flight.

Our cavalry is still in pursuit of, the flying rebels. The particulars cannot be ascertained.

It is asserted as the prevailing opinion in Washington, that, by this time the National flag floats over New Orleans.


WASHINGTON, March 22.— We are assured from a perfectly reliable source that there is not an Armstrong gun in this country, nor has Sir William Armstrong ever made a gun for any other service than that of the British Government.

The large rifled ordinance procured from England by the rebels were made at the Low Moor works, and are made after designs of Capt. Blakely of the Royal Artillery. About twenty of these Blakely guns delivered to the rebels are rifled hundred pounders, which with thirty smooth siege guns constitute all the heavy ordinance of the enemy received from abroad which have escaped capture.

Most of the rifled cannon used by the rebels have been smooth navy guns rifled, and many of them have burst from the enormous strain put upon them which they were not designed to bear.


Lieutenant Wordon [sic] 5 is improving. His friends are now confident that he will completely recover his eyesight.

From Burnside—Fort Macon blown up—Steamer Nashville Burned— Beaufort Probably Occupied.

FORTRESS MONROE, March 23— The steamer Chancellor Livingston, arrived from Hatteras last night.

Immediately on the occupation of Newbern [sic] an expedition to Beaufort was started by General Burnside [Ambrose E. Burnside]. The place was, however, evacuated before our troops approached. Fort Macon was blown up by the rebels and the steamer Nashville burned.

On the day General Burnside occupied Newbern [sic], 1,600 rebel troops were on the road between Goldsboro and Newbern [sic].

First Battle of Kernstown, 23 March1862 - History

On 23rd March 1862 Stonewall Jackson entered into his first serious clash in the Shenandoah Valley, at the Battle of Kernstown. The fight was part of what became known as the 1862 Valley Campaign, a series of engagements that would make Jackson a legend. However, at Kernstown the Confederate General had miscalculated he had mistaken a superior Union force for a demoralized rearguard. The result for his men was a vicious clash centred around a low stone wall on what was called ‘Sandy Ridge’. Amongst his small army were 187 Officers and men of the 1st Virginia Battalion, otherwise known as the ‘Irish Battalion.’

Following Virginia’s secession on 17th April, 1861, the Virginia Convention sought to establish a provisional army of two regiments of artillery, eight regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry. These men were to enlist for a period of three years. As the majority of Virginians anticipated a short war, most chose to enlist in volunteer regiments which required a commitment of only one year. As a result only one battalion sized infantry unit of the provisional army came into being- the 1st Battalion Virginia Infantry (Irish). (1)

The battalion was organised in May 1861, and the rank and file consisted mainly of Irish laborers from towns and cities such as Norfolk, Alexandria, Covington, Richmond and Lynchburg. Although most of the men were Irish, the unit was officered by native-born Virginians, many of whom had been trained at the Virginia Military Institute and West Point. The five companies were mustered into Confederate service on 30th June 1861 as the 1st Battalion Virginia Regulars. (2)

The Battle of Kernstown would prove to be the Irishmen’s first major test of the war. Stonewall Jackson’s opponent on the day was technically Tyrone-born Brigadier-General James Shields, but an injury received the day before the battle had disabled the Union commander, who was forced to hand over effective command at Kernstown to Colonel Nathan Kimball (this did not prevent Shields from subsequently claiming credit for the victory). Jackson had ordered his 3,400 men to the attack believing they faced only some 3,000 soldiers who represented the Federal rearguard at Winchester. The 187 men of the 1st Virginia Battalion moved forward with their unsuspecting comrades against an enemy force which in fact numbered some 8,500.

It was early afternoon when Jackson, leading his army north up the Valley Pike, found what he assumed to be the outnumbered Union force positioned on an eminence to the immediate west of the Pike known as Pritchard’s Hill. Conferring with his cavalry commander Turner Ashby, who had been skirmishing with the Federals, the Confederate General decided to launch his main attack around the right of the enemy position. Jackson left Turner’s cavalry to deal with any Union threat to the west of the Pike and on the road itself, before amassing 24 guns to the left of the route to occupy the enemy. Meanwhile he would lead his main force further off to the left of the Pike to execute his plan. On the day of battle the Virginia Irishmen formed part of the brigade of Colonel Jesse Burks, and were led by Richmond native Captain David B. Bridgford. At the start of the engagement they were assigned to provide infantry support to the artillery concentration, specifically to Captain Carpenter’s Battery. (3)

David B. Bridgford who commanded the Irish Battalion at the Battle of Kernstown

The 1st Battalion remained in position with Carpenter’s guns for around 90 minutes, all the while being subjected to unnerving counter-battery fire from guns on Pritchard’s Hill. They managed to see this duty through without sustaining any casualties, but their good fortune would not hold. Sometime around 4.30pm they received an order to move a half-mile to their left front, where the main battle was now being fought. All had not gone to plan for the Confederates on the Irishmen’s left during the intervening period. As the main Rebel force had sought to outflank Pritchard’s Hill they had been subjected to artillery fire, and a brigade which attempted to assault the Federal positions at the base of the hill had been repulsed. Meanwhile Jackson had continued to shuttle his men towards the high ground of Sandy Ridge on the Union right, where the fighting would soon intensify. Having moved to directly support this flanking attempt, the Irish regulars spent some 30 minutes in rear of the Rockbridge artillery before finally being thrown into the infantry contest. (4)

The focus of the fighting on Sandy Ridge was a half mile long low stone wall, which both sides had initially raced to occupy- the Confederates had got their first, but the contest would ebb and flow back and forth over the position for nearly two hours. As more and more Union troops began to appear on and about the Ridge, it was beginning to become horrifyingly clear to Jackson and his men that far from facing a demoralised rearguard, they were in fact heavily outnumbered and staring at potential destruction. It was late afternoon when the 1st Virginia moved towards the top of the Ridge and the stone wall again conflicting orders bedeviled deployment, with three companies (including Captain Bridgford) moving to the left of the line and two towards the right. They would fight separately for the remainder of the battle. The Irishmen did not have to wait long to encounter the enemy on their arrival at the top of Sandy Ridge. Captain Bridgford described the scene:

‘[The] position was directly opposite the enemy’s line, at a range of not more than twenty yards. We immediately took part in the action. The firing was general and continuous along both lines. The ground we occupied was soon dotted with dead and wounded men. The fire of the enemy was exceedingly severe. The colors of the battalion were planted on the crest of the ridge by Color-Sergeant Kenney…’ (5)

Men had begun to fall almost immediately, particular around the spot where Kenney had positioned the colors. Second Lieutenant Heth of Company D fell beside them, shot through the body while directing his men’s fire. Acting Sergeant-Major James Duggan from Derry took a horrific wound to the face in front of the colors while in the act of taking aim. Meanwhile the two separated companies of the battalion under Captain Thom of Company C were enduring an equally trying ordeal. Twice they repelled Union assaults, with Thom himself taking a bullet to the left breast, which was stopped from entering his body by a copy of the New Testament he had fortuitously placed there. (6)

The final Confederate retreat at the Battle of Kernstown by Alfred Waud (Library of Congress)

Despite the efforts of the Irishmen and their Virginian officers the position they faced becoming hopeless for the Confederates. Eventually Jackson’s entire line began to crumble and was forced into retreat, with the 1st Virginia and the rest of the Rebel force being driven from the stone wall and Sandy Ridge. Fortunately for Stonewall and his men the Union troops were themselves too disorganised to form an effective pursuit. The Confederates moved back down the Valley Pike Stonewall Jackson had suffered what would turn out to be the only defeat of his military career. (7)

Captain Bridgford reported 47 casualties in the Irish Battalion at the Battle of Kernstown, including 6 killed, 20 wounded and 21 missing, although the unit’s muster rolls indicate that these losses were somewhat greater, amounting to 12 killed, 28 wounded and 19 prisoners of war. The 1st Virginia Irish Battalion would continue to fight with Jackson’s army and experience ultimate success with him during the Valley Campaign. They became the Provost Guard for Jackson’s Corps on 11th October 1862, a role which they would adopt for the entire Army of Northern Virginia after the Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863. Despite this function, the unit was plagued by desertion and notorious ill-discipline for much of the war. Many of its original Irish component were not present by war’s end, when the remnants of the Battalion surrendered with the rest of Robert E. Lee’s army at Appomattox Court House in 1865. (8)

(1) Driver Jr and Ruffner 1996:1 (2) Ibid.: 1-2 (3) Cozzens 2008: 168, Official Records: 405, Driver Jr and Ruffner 1996:12 (4) Official Records: 405, Driver Jr and Ruffner 1996: 12 (5) Cozzens 2008: 172-185, Driver Jr and Ruffner 1996: 12, Official Records: 405 (6) Official Records: 406-7, Driver Jr and Ruffner 1996: 102 (7) Cozzens 2008: 192-207 (8) Driver Jr and Ruffner 1996: 32, 35-6

References and Further Reading

Cozzens, Peter 2008. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign

Driver Jr., Robert & Ruffner, Kevin 1996. 1st Battalion Virginia Infantry, 39th Battalion Virginia Cavalry, 24th Battalion Virginia Partisan Rangers

Official Records Series 1, Volume 12, Part 1, Chapter 24. Report of Capt. D. B. Bridgford, First Virginia Battalion

The Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley

Stonewall Jackson's Only Defeat on the Battlefield

Sketch of the First Battle of Kernstown

General Location: A few miles south of Winchester and west of US 11 (Valley Pike) and north of Hoge Run. Route 37 (4-lane bypass) bisects the area of heaviest fighting along Sand Ridge.

Principal Commanders: Confederate Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson Union Colonel Nathan Kimball, in temporary command Brigadier General James Shields' division.

Forces Engaged: Confederate forces consisted of Jackson's infantry division whcih contained three brigades, those of Brigadier Generals Garnett, Burks, and Fulkerson, 27 pieces of artillery, and a cavalry contingent under Col. Turner Ashby total strength did not exceed about 3,600-3,800, of which most were engaged.

Union forces consisted of Shield's infantry division also consisting of three brigades under Colonels Kimball, Sullivan, and Tyler. Federal artillery consisted of 24 guns, and 16 companies of cavalry under Broadhead total force between 8,500 and 9,000, three-fourths of which were brought into action.

Casualties: Confederates: 718 (80killed/375wounded/263missing or captured) Union: 590 (118killed/450wounded/22missing or captured).

Significance: This battle is considered by many historians as the opening conflict of the famous Valley Campaign of 1862. It was the only battle recorded as "lost" by Stonewall Jackson, but in many ways he gained as much by losing as by winning. After the battle, President Lincoln was disturbed by Jackson's potential threat to Washington and redirected more than 35,000 men to defend approaches from the Valley before the campaign was finished. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's army was deprived of these reinforcements, which he claimed would have enabled him to take Richmond during his Peninsular campaign. Because of this redeployment of Federal troops, First Kernstown is considered one of the decisive engagements of 1862.

Description of the Battle

Prelude: Acting on faulty intelligence from Colonel Turner Ashby that suggested that his small army outnumbered the Federal forces at Winchester, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson moved to strike his opponents and prevent US reinforcements from leaving the Valley to aid McClellan's army on the Peninsula. The division of Brig. Gen. James Shields in fact outnumbered Jackson more than two-to-one. On the afternoon of 22 March, Ashby's cavalry and horse artillery skirmished with US forces near Kernstown. General Shields was wounded in this affair, his arm broken by a shell fragment, and divisional command devolved to Col. Nathan Kimball.

Phase One. Skirmishing at Kernstown: At dawn Kimball moved against Ashby's advance on the Valley Pike north of Kernstown. Sullivan's and a portion of Kimball's US brigades advanced, straddling the pike, and pushed Ashby south of Hoge's Run, taking possession of Pritchard's Hill. Ashby's troopers formed a new defensive line, which was later supported by infantry and maintained throughout the battle. Jenks' US battery unlimbered on Pritchard's Hill and responded to Ashby's artillery in position near the Opequon Church. About 1100 hours, Jackson's infantry began to concentrate south of Kernstown. It was soon evident to Kimball that Jackson's army was arriving on the field. Kimball consolidated his position and awaited reinforcements.

Phase Two. CS Flank Movement: By 1400 hours, Jackson's infantry was on the field, massed south of Kernstown. Jackson launched a feint toward Kimball's main position along the Pike with a portion of Burks' brigade, but this was to disguise a flanking movement to his left along Sand Ridge on the west. Jackson directed Fulkerson's and Garnett's brigades to the ridge, leaving Burks to support Ashby. Confederate artillery (3 batteries) were positioned on the eastern face of the ridge and engaged US batteries on Pritchard's Hill. Fulkerson advanced under fire on the left, and managed to seize a stone fence running generally east-west on the Glass farm. This gave the Confederates covoer and an excellent firing position. Garnett came up on Fulkerson's right, extending the CS battle line from Opequon Creek east across the front of the ridge, then bending back south to cover the artillery. A regiment was deployed across the Middle Road to maintain a connection between the Confederates flanks.

Recognizing the threat to his right, Kimball moved Tyler's brigade forward from its reserve position near the toll gate at the intersection of the Valley Pike and Cedar Creek Grade to confront Fulkerson and Garnett. As the artillery duel continued, skirmishers closed and the fighting began to heat up.

Phase Three. US Assault on Sand Ridge: At 1600 hours, Tyler deployed his five regiments (about 3,000 men) and attacked the rebel position on Sand Ridge, supported by his batteries on Pritchard's Hill and a small cavalry force on his far right flank. Several attempts to turn the Confederate left flank were repulsed with heavy casualties. Tyler now focused his attention on the CS center on the crest of the ridge. Recognizing that Ashby's activity on the Valley Pike was a demonstration only, Colonel Kimball marched his brigade and part of Sullivan's (about 3,000) to the right, joining with Tyler to assault the CS center and right on Sand Ridge. Garnett's outnumbered brigade lacked the protection of a stone fence like Fulkerson's and , running low on ammunition, soon began to fall back. Jackson dispatched two regiments to the support of Garnett but before they arrived, Garnett ordered a withdrawal, believing his position untenable. This order to withdraw later resulted in his arrest and ultimately diminished what would have been a brilliant career for General Garnett.

This movement opened Fulkerson's right flank to a heavy fire and he too retired. The retreat soon became badly disorganized. The CS artillery kept US forces in the open ground east of Sand Ridge at bay, firing canister, but no fire could be brought to bear along the wooded ridge itself. The Union advance along the crest forced the guns to retire.

Phase Four. Rear Guard Action: Jackson deployed two regiments 5VA and 42VA) across the ridge to slow the US advance. Several regiment-sized attacks were repulsed, and for a brief time fighting was fierce and hand-to-hand. According to Henderson, an early biographer of Jackson, colors of the 5th Ohio changed hands six times. A body of US cavalry advanced south along the road (rte.621), but were checked by Oliver Funston's cavalry. Darkness ended the fighting.

Phase Five. CS Retreat: Jackson withdrew along "Stone Lane" past the Magill House and south along the Valley Pike. Ashby remained with the cavalry at Bartonsville, while the infantry went on to Newtown (Stephens City). Jackson reportedly slept in the corner of a rail fence near Bartonsville. US forces did not pursue.

1862 Valley Campaign Timeline

November 4, 1861 - General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson takes command of the Valley District.

December 8-12, 1861 - Actions at Dam no. 5, C&O Canal

January 1, 1862 - Jackson begins winter campaign in Winchester, Virginia.

January 3-5, 1862 - Skirmishes at Bath and Hancock

January 10, 1862 - Confederates reach Romney (present day West Virginia)

January 23-30, 1862 - Jackson's Army return to Winchester

February 7, 1862 - Union forces reoccupy Romney

February 24-26, 1862 - Major General Nathaniel P. Banks Army cross the Potomac River into Virginia.

March 11,1862 - Thomas J. Jackson evacuates Winchester.

March 12, 1862 - Nathaniel P. Banks occupies Winchester.

March 18, 1862 - Skirmish at Middletown.

March 23, 1862 - First Battle of Kernstown
Forces Engaged: 12,300 total (US 8,500 CS 3,800)
Estimated Casualties: 1,308 total (US 590 CS 718)
Result: Union Victory

March 24, 1862 - Jackson's army retreats

April 1-2, 1862 - Federals follow south to Edinburg

April 12, 1862 - Banks assumes command of the Department of the Shenandoah.

April 17, 1862 - Federals reach Mount Jackson and New Market

April 19, 1862 - Jackson falls back east to Swift Run Gap

April 22, 1862 - Union troops occupy Harrisonburg

April 30, 1862 - Jackson sets out towards Staunton Richard S. Ewell's division crosses the Blue Ridge at Swift Run Gap into the Shenandoah Valley.

May 3, 1862 - Jackson's army departs the Valley via Brown's Gap.

May 4, 1862 - Jackson returns his army to the Valley by rail, from Mechum's River Station via Rockfish Gap to Staunton.

May 8, 1862 - Battle of McDowell
Forces Engaged: 12,500 total (US 6,500 CS 3,000)
Result: Confederate Victory

May 12, 1862 - General James Shields Federals are recalled from the Valley - Banks withdraws to Strasburg.

May 20, 1862 - Jackson's and Ewell's men unite at New Market.

May 23, 1862 - Battle of Front Royal
Forces Engaged: 4,063 total (US 1,063 CS 3,000)
Estimated Casualties: 960 total (US 904 CS 56)
Result: Confederate Victory

May 24, 1862 - Running fight through Middletown as Banks retreats to Winchester.

May 25, 1862 - First Battle of Winchester
Forces Engaged: 22,500 total (US 6,500 CS 16,000)
Estimated Casualties: 2,419 total (US 2,019 CS 400)
Result: Confederate Victory

May 29-30, 1862 - Jackson demonstrates against Harper's Ferry.

May 31, 1862 - Jackson's army marches through Winchester.

May 30-June 5, 1862 - Jackson falls back to Harrisonburg

June 6, 1862 - Engagement of Harrisonburg death of Colonel Turner Ashby

June 8, 1862 - Battle of Cross Keys
Forces Engaged: 17,300 total (US 11,500 CS 5,800)
Estimated Casualties: 951 total (US 664 CS 287)
Result: Confederate Victory

June 9, 1862 - Battle of Port Republic
Forces Engaged: 9,500 total (US 3,500 CS 6,000)
Estimated Casualties: 1,818 total (US 1,002 CS 816)
Result: Confederate Victory

June 17, 1862 - Jackson leaves the Valley for Richmond, Virginia.


  • Clark, Champ, and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Decoying the Yanks: Jackson's Valley Campaign. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4724-X.
  • Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8078-3200-4.
  • Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3.
  • Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1.
  • Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4.
  • Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign Spring 1862. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1976. ISBN 0-385-12148-2.
  • Walsh, George. Damage Them All You Can: Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. New York: Forge, 2002. ISBN 978-0-312-87445-2.

Watch the video: Battle of Hampton Roads #1 8 March 1862 - Union vs Confederacy American Civil War (June 2022).


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